PT-2025-42826 · Go · Github.Com/Microstack-Tech/Parallax

Publicado

2025-10-10

·

Atualizado

2025-10-10

CVSS v3.1

7.5

Alta

VetorAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Impact

A vulnerable node can be made to consume very large amounts of memory when handling specially crafted p2p messages sent from an attacker node.
In order to carry out the attack, the attacker establishes a peer connections to the victim, and sends a malicious GetBlockHeadersRequest message with a count of 0, using the Parallax protocol.
In descendants := chain.GetHeadersFrom(num+count-1, count-1), the value of count-1 is passed to the function GetHeadersFrom(number, count uint64) as parameter count. Due to integer overflow, UINT64 MAX value is then passed as the count argument to function GetHeadersFrom(number, count uint64). This allows an attacker to bypass maxHeadersServe and request all headers from the latest block back to the genesis block.

Patches

The fix has been included in the Parallax client version 0.1.4 and onwards.

Workarounds

No workarounds have been made public.

Credit

This issue was disclosed responsibly by DongHan Kim via the Ethereum bug bounty program, the cooperation is appreciated.

Correção

Resource Exhaustion

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Enumeração de Fraquezas

Identificadores relacionados

GHSA-XC79-566C-J4QX

Produtos afetados

Github.Com/Microstack-Tech/Parallax