PT-2026-35106 · Packagist · Craftcms/Cms
Publicado
2026-04-14
·
Atualizado
2026-04-14
CVSS v4.0
5.5
Média
| Vetor | AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P |
Summary
The
resource-js endpoint in Craft CMS allows unauthenticated requests to proxy remote JavaScript resources.
When trustedHosts is not explicitly restricted (default configuration), the application trusts the client-supplied Host header.This allows an attacker to control the derived
baseUrl, which is used in prefix validation inside actionResourceJs().
By supplying a malicious Host header, the attacker can make the server issue arbitrary HTTP requests, leading to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).Details
The vulnerability exists in
AppController::actionResourceJs().The function validates that the
url parameter starts with assetManager->baseUrl. However, baseUrl is derived from the current request host. If trustedHosts is not configured, the Host header is fully attacker-controlled.Attack chain:
- Attacker sends request with controlled
Hostheader. - Application derives
baseUrlfrom the malicious Host. urlparameter is required to start with thisbaseUrl.- Validation passes.
- Guzzle performs a server-side HTTP request to the attacker-controlled host.
- SSRF occurs.
This does not rely on string parsing bypass. It relies on Host header trust.
PoC (safe reproduction steps)
Environment:
- Craft CMS 5.9.12
- Default configuration (no trustedHosts restriction)
- Docker deployment
-
Start a listener inside the container: python3 -m http.server 9999
-
Send a request to resource-js with a controlled Host header.
-
Observe that the internal listener receives a request (OOB confirmation).
Correção
SSRF
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Craftcms/Cms