PT-2026-35307 · Npm · @Saltcorn/Server
Publicado
2026-04-16
·
Atualizado
2026-04-16
CVSS v4.0
5.1
Média
| Vetor | AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N |
Summary
Saltcorn validates the post-login
dest parameter with a string check that only blocks :/ and //. Because all WHATWG-compliant browsers normalise backslashes (``) to forward slashes (/) for special schemes, a payload such as /evil.com/path slips through is relative url(), is emitted unchanged in the HTTP Location header, and causes the browser to navigate cross-origin to an attacker-controlled domain. The bug is reachable on a default install and only requires a victim who can be tricked into logging in via a crafted Saltcorn URL.Details
Vulnerable function:
packages/server/routes/utils.js:393-395js
const is relative url = (url) => {
return typeof url === "string" && !url.includes(":/") && !url.includes("//");
};The function's intent is to allow only same-origin redirects, but the allow-list only checks for two literal substrings. It does not handle:
- backslash characters, which WHATWG URL parsing (used by every modern browser) treats as forward slashes for the special schemes
http,https,ftp,ws,wss. A URL parser fed/evil.com/pathwith a base ofhttp://victim/resolves tohttp://evil.com/path. - non-
http(s):schemes that do not contain:/. The stringsjavascript:alert(1),data:text/html,...,vbscript:...all pass.
Vulnerable callsite:
packages/server/auth/routes.js:1371-1376js
} else if (
(req.body || {}).dest &&
is relative url(decodeURIComponent((req.body || {}).dest))
) {
res.redirect(decodeURIComponent((req.body || {}).dest));
} else res.redirect("/");The body's
dest is URL-decoded twice (once by body-parser, once by the explicit decodeURIComponent) and the same value is passed to res.redirect. Express 5's res.redirect runs the value through encodeurl@2.0.0, whose whitelist character class [^x21x23-x3Bx3Dx3F-x5Fx61-x7Ax7Cx7E] includes x5C (backslash). The backslash is therefore not percent-encoded and ends up verbatim in the Location response header.PoC
Please extract the uploaded compressed file before proceeding
- ./setup.sh
- ./poc.sh
Impact
Any user who can be lured into clicking a Saltcorn login URL crafted by the attacker will, after submitting their valid credentials, be redirected to an attacker-controlled origin. The redirect happens under the trusted Saltcorn domain, so the user has no visual cue that they are about to leave the site. Realistic abuse patterns:
- Credential phishing — the attacker's site renders a forged "session expired, please log in again" prompt to capture the password the user just typed.
Correção
Open Redirect
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