PT-2026-51644 · Pypi · Motioneye
Publicado
2026-06-23
·
Atualizado
2026-06-23
·
CVE-2026-55488
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Summary
mEye contains an absolute path traversal vulnerability in multiple media file handlers that allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the filesystem.
The affected handlers accept a user-controlled filename parameter and construct filesystem paths using
os.path.join(). When an absolute path is supplied, Python discards the configured media directory and returns the attacker-supplied path directly. The application then bypasses Tornado's built-in path validation by overriding the relevant safety checks.As a result, an attacker can access files outside of the configured camera media directory, subject to the permissions of the motionEye process.
Details
The issue exists in the media playback and download functionality.
The filename parameter is passed to
mediafiles.get media path():python
def get media path(camera config, path, media type):
target dir = camera config.get('target dir')
full path = os.path.join(target dir, path)
return full pathWhen path is an absolute path (e.g.
/etc/motioneye/motion.conf), Python's os.path.join() discards target dir entirely and returns the absolute path as-is. This would normally be caught by Tornado's StaticFileHandler path validation, but MoviePlaybackHandler explicitly overrides both safety checks (movie playback.py lines 111-115):def get absolute path(self, root, path):
return path
def validate absolute path(self, root, absolute path):
return absolute pathThis allows reading any file on the filesystem that the motionEye process can access.
The same path traversal exists in the movie download, picture download, and picture preview handlers:
- GET /movie//download/
- GET /picture//download/
- GET /picture//preview/
PoC
GET /movie/1/playback//etc/motioneye/motion.conf HTTP/1.1
Host: target:8765Fix
Do not allow absolute paths supplied by user input.
Validate that the fully resolved canonical path remains within the configured camera media directory before serving a file.
Additionally, Tornado’s built-in path validation should not be bypassed unless equivalent validation is performed by motionEye.
Path traversal
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Motioneye