PT-2026-53386 · Pypi · Backpropagate

Publicado

2026-06-29

·

Atualizado

2026-06-29

CVSS v4.0

9.3

Crítica

VetorAV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Summary

In backpropagate >= 1.1.0, the optional Reflex web UI (pip install backpropagate[ui], launched via backprop ui) exposes a training control plane: dataset upload, model load, training start/stop, multi-run orchestration, GGUF export, and HuggingFace Hub push.
The CLI accepts two operator-facing flags intended as security controls:
  • --auth user:pass — documented as "require HTTP Basic authentication on every request to the UI."
  • --share — documented as "expose the UI on a public address; requires --auth."
When --auth user:pass is passed, the CLI prints Auth: enabled (user: <username>) to confirm to the operator that authentication is active, then exports BACKPROPAGATE UI AUTH=user:pass to the subprocess that launches the Reflex backend.
The Reflex backend (backpropagate/ui app/**) never reads BACKPROPAGATE UI AUTH. No authentication middleware is registered. No request-level guard runs. No WebSocket upgrade guard runs. Any client that reaches the bound port — local or remote, depending on whether --share is used — has full UI access.
An inline comment at backpropagate/cli.py:1217-1218 in the v1.1.0 source documents the gap: "For Phase 1 the variable is exported but Reflex doesn't read it yet." This comment was internal-facing; the user-facing documentation (README, CHANGELOG, SHIP GATE) advertised the contract as enforced.
This advisory is filed primarily because the runtime contradicted an operator-facing security claim. Code-only bugs of comparable shape (auth check missing entirely from a path) would already warrant disclosure; the additional false-promise dimension raises the severity.

Impact

An attacker who reaches the bound port can:
  • Read uploaded datasets rendered in the UI preview, including content of any JSONL/CSV/TXT file the legitimate operator has uploaded for fine-tuning.
  • Trigger arbitrary training runs against any base model the operator has installed locally or that can be downloaded from HuggingFace.
  • Trigger HuggingFace Hub pushes to repositories named via the UI input (subject to the operator's local HF token's scope — typically all repos owned by the operator).
  • Cause disk-fill DoS via the rx.upload endpoint (no size cap, no extension filter, no per-session count cap in v1.1.0 / v1.1.1).
  • Read model paths (source model path, dataset path, model, uploaded path) which are user-supplied and bypass the safe path() helper that lives in backpropagate/ui security.py (path validation is dead code on the Reflex surface in v1.1.0 / v1.1.1).
The combination of unauthenticated training control, HF push target spoofing, and path-input traversal makes the affected endpoint suitable for both data exfiltration (reading uploaded training data) and supply-chain attacks (pushing tampered model weights to the operator's HF account).
The local-only default (no --share) reduces exposure to a host-local attacker. The --share flag is documented as a "public URL" feature; operators who used --share --auth user:pass had no warning that the auth half was inert.

Patches

Fixed in v1.2.0 (released 2026-05-23). The patch implements real ASGI middleware via rx.App(api transformer=basic auth transformer) that gates HTTP routes AND the / event WebSocket upgrade. Four modes (no auth local only / token auto / explicit creds / production), HMAC-signed cookie validated PRE-websocket.accept(), Host + Origin allowlists. The middleware ships alongside a 4-layer defense in depth at the cli.py / ui app/app.py / rxconfig.py / env-strip surfaces so direct python -m reflex run invocations (bypassing the CLI guard) also enforce authentication.
Upgrade with:
  • pip: pip install --upgrade backpropagate
  • npm: npm install -g @mcptoolshop/backpropagate@latest
Full release notes: https://github.com/mcp-tool-shop-org/backpropagate/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#120---2026-05-23

Workarounds

If users cannot upgrade immediately:
  1. Do not pass --auth or --share to backprop ui. Run the UI with no flags (backprop ui); it will bind to localhost and accept any client that can reach 127.0.0.1.
  2. For remote access, use SSH port-forwarding instead of --share:
# On the client:
ssh -L 7860:localhost:7860 <training-host>
# On the server:
backprop ui      # no --share
# Then open http://localhost:7860 in your local browser.
SSH provides the authentication layer the Reflex UI did not. 3. Audit existing deployments. If any host running backpropagate >= 1.1.0 has previously been launched with --share, treat any uploaded training data, model paths, or HF push targets visible in that UI session as potentially exposed. Re-issue HF tokens that have been in use during such sessions.
Binary distribution gap. Standalone binaries (Windows .exe / macOS .app via PyInstaller) failed to build for v1.2.0 and will land in a follow-up patch release. In the interim, users who relied on the v1.1.x binary distribution should install the patched version via pip install backpropagate==1.2.0 to receive the auth-bypass fix. The v1.2.0 PyPI package and @mcptoolshop/backpropagate@1.2.0 npm package both carry the patched code.

Credit

Discovered by the dogfood-swarm Stage A audit on 2026-05-22 (finding ID FRONTEND-A-001, classified CRITICAL). The audit also surfaced contradicting documentation in CHANGELOG / SHIP GATE / README; those were corrected in v1.2.0 alongside the runtime fix.

Correção

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Identificadores relacionados

PYSEC-2026-291

Produtos afetados

Backpropagate