PT-2026-53437 · Pypi · H11

Publicado

2026-06-29

·

Atualizado

2026-06-29

CVSS v3.1

9.1

Crítica

VetorAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Impact

A leniency in h11's parsing of line terminators in chunked-coding message bodies can lead to request smuggling vulnerabilities under certain conditions.

Details

HTTP/1.1 Chunked-Encoding bodies are formatted as a sequence of "chunks", each of which consists of:
  • chunk length
  • r
  • length bytes of content
  • r
In versions of h11 up to 0.14.0, h11 instead parsed them as:
  • chunk length
  • r
  • length bytes of content
  • any two bytes
i.e. it did not validate that the trailing r bytes were correct, and if you put 2 bytes of garbage there it would be accepted, instead of correctly rejecting the body as malformed.
By itself this is harmless. However, suppose you have a proxy or reverse-proxy that tries to analyze HTTP requests, and your proxy has a different bug in parsing Chunked-Encoding, acting as if the format is:
  • chunk length
  • r
  • length bytes of content
  • more bytes of content, as many as it takes until you find a r
For example, pound had this bug -- it can happen if an implementer uses a generic "read until end of line" helper to consumes the trailing r .
In this case, h11 and your proxy may both accept the same stream of bytes, but interpret them differently. For example, consider the following HTTP request(s) (assume all line breaks are r ):
GET /one HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
 
5
AAAAAXX2
45
0

GET /two HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
 
0
Here h11 will interpret it as two requests, one with body AAAAA45 and one with an empty body, while our hypothetical buggy proxy will interpret it as a single request, with body AAAAXX20r r GET /two .... And any time two HTTP processors both accept the same string of bytes but interpret them differently, you have the conditions for a "request smuggling" attack. For example, if /two is a dangerous endpoint and the job of the reverse proxy is to stop requests from getting there, then an attacker could use a bytestream like the above to circumvent this protection.
Even worse, if our buggy reverse proxy receives two requests from different users:
GET /one HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

5
AAAAAXX999
0
GET /two HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
Cookie: SESSION KEY=abcdef...
...it will consider the first request to be complete and valid, and send both on to the h11-based web server over the same socket. The server will then see the two concatenated requests, and interpret them as one request to /one whose body includes /two's session key, potentially allowing one user to steal another's credentials.

Patches

Fixed in h11 0.15.0.

Workarounds

Since exploitation requires the combination of buggy h11 with a buggy (reverse) proxy, fixing either component is sufficient to mitigate this issue.

Credits

Reported by Jeppe Bonde Weikop on 2025-01-09.

Correção

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dbugs@ptsecurity.com

Identificadores relacionados

PYSEC-2026-348

Produtos afetados

H11