PT-2026-55139 · Go · Oras.Land/Oras-Go/V2
Publicado
2026-07-01
·
Atualizado
2026-07-01
CVSS v3.1
7.5
Alta
| Vetor | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N |
Summary
oras-go follows a registry-controlled
Location header during the monolithic blob upload flow and reuses the Authorization header from the initial POST request for the subsequent PUT request. If a malicious registry returns a cross-host Location, oras-go can send the caller's credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint.Affected Versions
tested: v2.6.0 (commit 03243809936cce826494b5506f724c6dc11115b1, as-of 2026-01-24)
range: unknown; likely affects earlier v2.x releases that include the same upload flow
Impact
Credential leak to an attacker-controlled endpoint and client-side ssrf to a cross-host target.
Affected Component
registry/remote/repository.go:878-916(blobStore.completePushAfterInitialPost)
Reproduction
Attachments include
poc.zip with a local-only harness (no real registry required). It runs a fake registry server that returns a cross-host Location and a second server that records whether it received Authorization.bash
unzip -q -o poc.zip -d /tmp/poc
cd /tmp/poc/poc-F-ORAS-LOCATION-UPLOAD-001
make canonical
make controlRecommended Fix
- validate
Locationbefore uploading (scheme + hostname + effective port) against the original request, or require an explicit opt-in allowlist for cross-host upload urls - never forward
Authorizationwhen the upload target changes host or scheme
references
- security policy: https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/security/policy
- vulnerable code:
registry/remote/repository.go(seeblobStore.completePushAfterInitialPost)
Correção
SSRF
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Oras.Land/Oras-Go/V2