PT-2026-56322 · Wpdo5Ea · Dologin Security
Publicado
2026-07-08
·
Atualizado
2026-07-08
·
CVE-2026-14495
CVSS v3.1
8.8
Alta
| Vetor | AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
The DoLogin Security plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Insufficient Randomness in all versions up to, and including, 4.3. The vulnerability exists because
dologins::rrand() seeds the Mersenne Twister with mt srand((double) microtime() * 1000000) — discarding the integer-seconds component of microtime() and constraining the seed to a range of approximately 10^6 values (~20 bits of entropy) — after which every character of the 32-character magic-link token is drawn sequentially with mt rand(), making the entire token a deterministic function of that seed. Because Pswdless::try login() is registered on the unauthenticated init hook, resolves the target account by the auto-increment numeric ID embedded in the ?dologin=<id>.<hash> parameter, performs the hash comparison using a non-constant-time != operator, and then calls wp set auth cookie() directly — never passing through wp authenticate() and therefore never triggering the plugin's own Auth:: has login err() lockout — an unauthenticated attacker can brute-force the ~10^6-candidate seed space to reconstruct an active passwordless login token and authenticate as any targeted user, including administrators, without a password. Exploitation requires that a valid, unexpired passwordless login link (active for up to 7 days) exists for the target account at the time of the attack, and that the numeric link ID is known or guessable from the auto-increment primary key.Correção
Encontrou algum problema na descrição? Tem algo a acrescentar? Fique à vontade para nos escrever 👾
Enumeração de Fraquezas
Identificadores relacionados
Produtos afetados
Dologin Security