PT-2026-65664 · Pypi · Datamodel-Code-Generator

Publicado

2026-07-28

·

Atualizado

2026-07-28

CVSS v3.1

3.7

Baixa

VetorAV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Summary

When datamodel-code-generator fetches a remote schema and follows an HTTP redirect, it re-sends the original request headers, including any Authorization header, to the redirect target even when the redirect changes origin (host/port/scheme). Credentials that an operator scoped to a trusted schema host are therefore forwarded to an attacker-controlled or otherwise different host, leaking them.

Details

In src/datamodel code generator/http.py, get body() follows redirects manually and re-issues each hop with the same headers argument, with no check that the origin is unchanged:
python
for redirect count in range(MAX HTTP REDIRECTS + 1):
   validate url for fetch(current url, allow private network=allow private network)
  response = httpx.get(current url, headers=headers, follow redirects=False, ...) # same headers every hop
  if (redirect url := get redirect url(httpx, current url, response)) is None:
    break
  current url = redirect url
Browsers and HTTP clients such as requests/httpx strip Authorization when a redirect crosses origin; here it is preserved unconditionally. Headers are operator-supplied via --http-headers (and credentials can also arrive through --url userinfo), so a redirect from the trusted host to any other host discloses them.

PoC

Self-contained reproducer: https://gist.github.com/thegr1ffyn/ade3035d7f2be95e16f11698259cdbc2 Host A (the trusted schema host) 302-redirects to host B (a different origin) which records received headers; the request carries an auth token scoped to A.
(The PoC uses loopback servers; allow private network=True is only to avoid the separate SSRF guard blocking loopback and has no bearing on the leak.)

Impact

Exposure of sensitive information to an unauthorized actor (CWE-200). Affects operators who pass authentication headers/credentials to fetch a remote schema (--http-headers, --url with userinfo) when the configured host issues a redirect to a different origin — e.g. a compromised or open-redirect-prone schema host, or a redirect chain influenced by an attacker-supplied $ref. The leaked credential can then be replayed against the trusted host. This is a credential-scoping weakness secondary to, and in the same component as, the project's other SSRF hardening.

Suggested remediation

When a redirect changes the origin (scheme/host/port), drop Authorization and other sensitive headers before following it, matching the behavior of mainstream HTTP clients.

Maintainer status

Confirmed by maintainer review and regression tests. The private fix PR was merged and released in 0.63.0: https://github.com/koxudaxi/datamodel-code-generator-ghsa-r5vv-ff45-prp2/pull/1
Fix summary: strip Authorization, Cookie, and Proxy-Authorization headers when a redirect crosses origin; preserve headers for same-origin redirects.
Release status: fixed in 0.63.0; 0.62.0 and earlier are affected.
Validation: uv run --group test --extra http pytest tests/test http.py passed locally for the redirect regression coverage; uv run --group fix ruff check src/datamodel code generator/http.py tests/test http.py passed.
Submitted by: Hamza Haroon (thegr1ffyn)

Correção

Open Redirect

Information Disclosure

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Enumeração de Fraquezas

CWE-601CWE-200

Identificadores relacionados

GHSA-R5VV-FF45-PRP2

Produtos afetados

Datamodel-Code-Generator