PT-2026-67394 · Timlegge · Net::Saml2
CVE-2026-18092
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Publicado
2026-08-03
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Atualizado
2026-08-03
CVSS v3.1
8.1
Alta
| Vetor | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H |
Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass via XML signature wrapping because new from xml reads assertion identity with document-wide XPath instead of the signed subtree.
new from xml reads the NameID, attribute values, SessionIndex, audience and other identity fields with document-wide XPath, such as //saml:Assertion/saml:AttributeStatement/saml:Attribute and //saml:Subject/saml:NameID, which select the first matching element in document order rather than the element covered by the verified signature. handle response confirms that a signature is present and, when a cacert is configured, that it chains to the CA, but XML::Sig verifies only the element named by the signature's Reference URI, so unsigned sibling assertions in the same document are not covered. An attacker who holds any one IdP-signed assertion can add an unsigned attacker-authored assertion earlier in document order; the signature still verifies and the document-order XPath returns the attacker's NameID and attributes.
Any caller that passes an untrusted Response to new from xml can accept identity fields from an assertion the IdP never signed, even when a cacert trust anchor is configured, so a party holding one valid IdP-signed assertion can authenticate as an arbitrary user.
Correção
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
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Net::Saml2