Andrea Cosentino

#586of 55,135
320.7Total CVSS
Vulnerabilities · 41
Medium
14
High
13
Critical
14
PT-2026-55901
9.1
2026-07-06
Apache · Apache Camel · CVE-2026-48205
**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** Apache Camel versions 4.0.0 through 4.14.7 Apache Camel versions 4.15.0 through 4.18.2 Apache Camel versions 4.19.0 through 4.20.9 **Description** Improper input validation in the Apache Camel DNS component allows for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). The `camel-dns` producers read DNS operation parameters from Exchange message headers using plain strings: `dns.server`, `dns.name`, `dns.domain`, `dns.type`, `dns.class`, and `term`. Because these do not start with the Camel prefix, the `HttpHeaderFilterStrategy` allows them to pass from inbound HTTP requests into the Exchange. In routes bridging an HTTP consumer to a `dns:` producer, an unauthenticated attacker can set the `dns.server` header to redirect queries to a malicious DNS server to observe queried names or return poisoned responses. Additionally, manipulating `dns.name` or `dns.domain` allows for internal network reconnaissance by resolving arbitrary internal hostnames. **Recommendations** Upgrade to version 4.21.0. Upgrade to version 4.14.8 for those on the 4.14.x LTS stream. Upgrade to version 4.18.3 for those on the 4.18.x stream. After upgrading, replace the use of `dns.*` and `term` header names with `CamelDnsServer`, `CamelDnsName`, `CamelDnsDomain`, `CamelDnsType`, `CamelDnsClass`, and `CamelDnsTerm` in routes driving DNS operations. As a temporary mitigation, strip `dns.*` and `term` headers from untrusted ingress before they reach the `dns:` producer and set DNS parameters from a trusted source within the route.
PT-2026-55899
9.4
2026-07-06
Apache · Apache Camel · CVE-2026-48203
**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** Apache Camel versions 4.0.0 through 4.14.7 Apache Camel versions 4.15.0 through 4.18.2 Apache Camel versions 4.19.0 through 4.20.9 **Description** An injection and Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) issue exists in the Apache Camel Solr component. The `camel-solr` producer copies Exchange message headers starting with the `SolrParam.` prefix into Solr request parameters and those starting with `SolrField.` into indexed Solr document fields. Because these prefixes do not start with the `Camel` or `camel` namespace, the `HttpHeaderFilterStrategy` allows them to pass from inbound HTTP requests into the Exchange. In routes bridging an HTTP consumer to a `solr:` producer, an unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary Solr request parameters via `SolrParam.*` headers—such as `shards` or `stream.url` to trigger SSRF toward internal services or cloud metadata endpoints, or `qt` to access administrative handlers—and inject arbitrary fields into documents via `SolrField.*` headers. **Recommendations** Upgrade Apache Camel versions 4.0.0 through 4.14.7 to version 4.14.8. Upgrade Apache Camel versions 4.15.0 through 4.18.2 to version 4.18.3. Upgrade Apache Camel versions 4.19.0 through 4.20.9 to version 4.21.0. After upgrading, update routes that set Solr parameters or fields to use `CamelSolrParam.` and `CamelSolrField.` instead of `SolrParam.` and `SolrField.`. As a temporary mitigation, strip `SolrParam.*` and `SolrField.*` headers from untrusted ingress before they reach the `solr:` producer and set required parameters from a trusted source within the route.
PT-2026-55908
9.8
2026-07-06
Apache · Apache Camel · CVE-2026-53913
**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** Apache Camel versions 4.15.0 through 4.18.2 Apache Camel versions 4.19.0 through 4.20.9 **Description** Improper authentication and a failure to fail securely in the Apache Camel Keycloak component allow unauthenticated access to protected routes. The `KeycloakSecurityPolicy` uses the `KeycloakSecurityProcessor.beforeProcess()` function to validate requests. By default, the `requiredRoles` and `requiredPermissions` variables are empty, causing the system to skip cryptographic verification of the bearer access token, including checks for signature, issuer, and expiry. While requests without a token are rejected, any non-null value in the `Authorization: Bearer` header—such as an arbitrary string or a forged, unsigned JWT—is accepted. This occurs because `allowTokenFromHeader` is set to `true` by default. If a protected route forwards to a producer capable of executing code, this flaw can lead to unauthenticated remote code execution. **Recommendations** Update Apache Camel to version 4.21.0. Update Apache Camel to version 4.18.3 for those on the 4.18.x release stream. Configure a non-empty `requiredRoles` or `requiredPermissions` on every `KeycloakSecurityPolicy` to ensure token verification is performed. Set `allowTokenFromHeader` to `false` if the token is not expected to come from the request header. Perform token verification at the framework layer before the policy is applied.
PT-2026-55885
7.5
2026-07-06
Apache · Apache Camel · CVE-2026-43866
**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** Apache Camel versions 3.0.0 through 4.14.7 Apache Camel versions 4.15.0 through 4.18.2 Apache Camel versions 4.19.0 through 4.20.9 **Description** An issue exists in the Apache Camel JMS component where the `JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms()` function in `camel-jms` (and equivalent bindings in `camel-sjms`, `camel-sjms2`, `camel-amqp`, `camel-activemq`, and `camel-activemq6`) improperly handles the deserialization of incoming JMS ObjectMessage payloads when the `mapJmsMessage` option is enabled. Although a post-deserialization class check was implemented to restrict allowed classes, the `org.apache.camel.support.DefaultExchangeHolder` class is included in the allow-list. An attacker can send a crafted ObjectMessage with a `DefaultExchangeHolder` as the top-level object to bypass this check. The system then calls `DefaultExchangeHolder.unmarshal()`, allowing the attacker to inject arbitrary Exchange state—including message bodies, headers, properties, and variables—using only trusted `java.lang` and `java.util` types. This allows for the manipulation of routing, headers, exchange properties, and error handling without requiring a deserialization gadget chain. **Recommendations** Upgrade to version 4.21.0. Upgrade to version 4.14.8 for those on the 4.14.x LTS release stream. Upgrade to version 4.18.3 for those on the 4.18.x release stream. Restrict publish access to the queues and topics consumed by Camel to trusted producers via JMS broker authorization. Avoid exposing JMS consumers that map ObjectMessage bodies to untrusted networks.
PT-2026-55894
7.5
2026-07-06
Apache · Apache Camel · CVE-2026-46585
**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** Apache Camel versions 4.0.0 through 4.14.7 Apache Camel versions 4.15.0 through 4.18.2 Apache Camel versions 4.19.0 through 4.20.9 **Description** Improper input validation in the Apache Camel Lucene Component allows for authorization bypass through user-controlled keys. The `camel-lucene` producer reads search phrases from an Exchange header `LuceneConstants.HEADER QUERY` (with the value `QUERY`) and `HEADER RETURN LUCENE DOCS` (with the value `RETURN LUCENE DOCS`). Since these names lack the `Camel` or `camel` prefix, the `HttpHeaderFilterStrategy` allows them to pass from inbound HTTP requests into the Exchange. In routes exposing Lucene query operations via an HTTP consumer, an attacker can set the `QUERY` header to execute arbitrary queries against the full-text index, overriding intended filters. This can lead to unauthorized access to documents or high CPU consumption through expensive regular-expression queries. No credentials are required if the HTTP consumer is unauthenticated. **Recommendations** Upgrade to version 4.21.0. Upgrade to version 4.14.8 for those on the 4.14.x LTS stream. Upgrade to version 4.18.3 for those on the 4.18.x stream. After upgrading, routes setting the query via raw header names must use `CamelLuceneQuery` and `CamelLuceneReturnLuceneDocs` instead of `QUERY` and `RETURN LUCENE DOCS`. As a temporary mitigation, strip the `QUERY` and `RETURN LUCENE DOCS` headers before the Lucene producer and set the query from a trusted source.
PT-2026-55898
7.8
2026-07-06
Apache · Apache Camel · CVE-2026-46726
**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** Apache Camel versions 4.0.0 through 4.14.7 Apache Camel versions 4.15.0 through 4.18.2 Apache Camel versions 4.19.0 through 4.20.9 **Description** Improper input validation in the Vertx Websocket component allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and expose sensitive information. The `camel-vertx-websocket` consumer maps inbound WebSocket query and path parameters into the Camel Exchange header map via the `populateExchangeHeaders()` function without applying a HeaderFilterStrategy. This allows attackers to set internal control headers, such as `CamelHttpUri`, by providing them as query parameters. If the consumer feeds a downstream HTTP producer, the injected `CamelHttpUri` redirects the server-side request to an attacker-controlled destination. Furthermore, the HTTP producer resolves Camel property placeholders within the URI, potentially disclosing environment variables, application properties, or vault secrets to the attacker. **Recommendations** Upgrade to version 4.21.0. Upgrade to version 4.14.8 for those on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream. Upgrade to version 4.18.3 for those on the 4.18.x releases stream. Strip Camel control headers from inbound messages before they reach downstream producers by using `removeHeaders('Camel*')` and `removeHeaders('camel*')` at the start of the route. Require authentication on the WebSocket endpoint. Avoid bridging an untrusted consumer directly into an HTTP producer whose target URI can be driven from message headers.
PT-2026-55906
5.3
2026-06-09
Salesforce · Salesforce · CVE-2026-49099
**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** Apache Camel versions 4.0.0 through 4.14.7 Apache Camel versions 4.15.0 through 4.18.2 Apache Camel versions 4.19.0 through 4.20.9 **Description** An injection and authorization bypass issue exists in the Apache Camel Salesforce component. The `camel-salesforce` producer resolves operation parameters—including SOQL queries, SOSL searches, target SObject names and IDs, Apex REST URLs, methods, and query parameters—from Exchange message headers, prioritizing these over endpoint configurations via the `getParameter()` function. Because the control-header constants in `SalesforceEndpointConfig` (such as `sObjectQuery`, `sObjectSearch`, `sObjectName`, `sObjectId`, `apexUrl`, and `apexMethod`) lacked the Camel prefix, they were not blocked by the `HttpHeaderFilterStrategy` at the HTTP boundary. In routes bridging an HTTP consumer to a Salesforce producer, an unauthenticated HTTP client can inject these headers to override intended operations. This allows attackers to execute unauthorized SOQL queries, SOSL searches, CRUD operations, or redirect Apex REST calls using the broad permissions of the connected Salesforce integration user. **Recommendations** Upgrade Apache Camel versions 4.0.0 through 4.14.7 to version 4.14.8. Upgrade Apache Camel versions 4.15.0 through 4.18.2 to version 4.18.3. Upgrade Apache Camel versions 4.19.0 through 4.20.9 to version 4.21.0. After upgrading, update routes that set Salesforce operation parameters via raw header names to use `CamelSalesforce*` names (e.g., `CamelSalesforceSObjectQuery` and `CamelSalesforceApexUrl`) instead of `sObject*` or `apex*` values. As a temporary mitigation, strip Salesforce control headers from untrusted ingress before the Salesforce producer by using `removeHeaders('sObject*')` and `removeHeaders('apex*')` at the start of the route, and ensure parameters are set from a trusted source.