Cu64

**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** Lumiverse versions prior to 0.9.7 **Description** The `consumeNonce()` function only verifies that a module-level variable is set and has not expired, failing to validate values from the incoming HTTP request or bind the nonce to the administrator's session. If an `auth.api.signUpEmail()` call fails before the before hook executes—such as when BetterAuth rejects a duplicate email—the nonce remains set but is not consumed. This allows any POST request to the '/api/auth/sign-up/email' endpoint arriving within the 10-second window to register successfully, regardless of the sender. An attacker capable of predicting or observing when an administrator attempts to create a duplicate user can exploit this race condition to register an unauthorized account. **Recommendations** Update to version 0.9.7.

**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** Lumiverse versions prior to 0.9.7 **Description** The Spindle extension build pipeline executes `bun install` without the `--ignore-scripts` flag before performing the static backend safety scan via the `assertSafeBackendBundle()` function. This allows a malicious extension containing a `package.json` file with `preinstall`, `postinstall`, or `prepare` lifecycle scripts to achieve host-level code execution when an administrator initiates the installation process, occurring before any distribution files are inspected. **Recommendations** Update to version 0.9.7.

Lumiverse is a full-featured AI chat application. Prior to 0.9.7, when the primary toSmbPath(fullPath) call throws, the method falls back to a dirname/basename split and only validates the directory prefix. The basename is concatenated directly into the smbclient -c script without validation. smbclient interprets ; as a subcommand separator and !cmd as a local-shell escape that runs cmd on the host. A path whose directory component is clean but whose basename contains "; !<cmd>; echo " achieves arbitrary command execution on the Lumiverse server. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.7.

Lumiverse is a full-featured AI chat application. Prior to 0.9.7, the MCP server creation endpoint validates the command field against an allowlist of binary names but forwards the args array to the child process without any validation. Every binary on the allowlist accepts an inline-code execution flag (-e for node/bun, -c for python3/deno), giving any logged-in user arbitrary OS-level code execution on the Lumiverse server. The route requires only requireAuth (not requireOwner). The server binds on all interfaces (::) and the host-header rebinding check is bypassed trivially by any HTTP client that sends Host: localhost:<port> directly, making this exploitable from any machine with network access to the server port. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.7.

Lumiverse is a full-featured AI chat application. Prior to 0.9.7, the component override system transpiles user-supplied TSX via Sucrase and evaluates it with new Function, shadowing dangerous globals (fetch, window, eval, etc.) with undefined. A static source validator (validateComponentOverrideSource) additionally blocks these identifiers by word-boundary regex. Both controls are bypassed. String-split bypass of the static validator: any blocked identifier can be reconstructed at runtime from string fragments ('ownerDoc' + 'ument'). DOM ref escape from the sandbox: useRef and useEffect are provided in scope. A ref attached to a rendered element gives a live DOM node. From any real DOM node, node['ownerDoc'+'ument']['def'+'aultView'] yields the real window, bypassing all identifier shadows. Theme packs (.lumitheme / .lumiverse-theme) are the shareable delivery mechanism. A malicious pack is an exploit path: the victim imports the file, enables one component override in the Theme Editor, and the payload fires in their authenticated session.This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.7.