N8N-Mcp · N8N-Mcp · CVE-2026-42449
**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions**
n8n-MCP versions 2.47.4 through 2.47.13
**Description**
The synchronous URL validator in `SSRFProtection.validateUrlSync()` lacks IPv6 checks within the SDK embedder path, specifically affecting the `N8NDocumentationMCPServer` constructor, `getN8nApiClient()`, and `validateInstanceContext()`. This allows IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses to bypass checks for cloud-metadata, localhost, and private-IP ranges. An attacker providing a malicious `n8nApiUrl` value can trigger the server to issue HTTP requests to localhost services, RFC1918 private networks, or cloud metadata endpoints. This results in a non-blind Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where response bodies are returned to the caller and the `n8nApiKey` is forwarded in the `x-n8n-api-key` header to the attacker-controlled target.
**Recommendations**
Update to version 2.47.14.
As a temporary workaround, validate URLs before passing them to the SDK by rejecting any `n8nApiUrl` where the hostname is an IP literal.
As a temporary workaround, restrict egress at the network layer to block outbound traffic to RFC1918 ranges, link-local 169.254.0.0/16, and cloud metadata endpoints.
As a temporary workaround, reject user-controlled `n8nApiUrl` values.