Martin Strohmeier

**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** TCAS II systems using transponders compliant with MOPS earlier than RTCA DO-181F **Description** The issue allows an attacker to impersonate a ground station and issue a Comm-A Identity Request. This action can set the Sensitivity Level Control (SLC) to the lowest setting and disable the Resolution Advisory (RA), leading to a denial-of-service condition. **Recommendations** For TCAS II systems using transponders compliant with MOPS earlier than RTCA DO-181F, consider disabling the Comm-A Identity Request feature until a patch or update is available to prevent an attacker from setting the SLC to the lowest setting and disabling the RA. Restrict access to the system to minimize the risk of exploitation.

**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** No specific software or versions are mentioned in the provided descriptions. **Description** The issue involves utilizing software-defined radios and a custom low-latency processing pipeline to transmit RF signals with spoofed location data to aircraft targets. This can cause the appearance of fake aircraft on displays and potentially trigger undesired Resolution Advisories (RAs). **Recommendations** At the moment, there is no information about a newer version that contains a fix for this vulnerability.

**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** Combined Charging System (CCS) (affected versions not specified) HomePlug Green PHY (HPGP) (affected versions not specified) **Description** The issue affects Electric Vehicles (EV) that utilize the Combined Charging System (CCS) for DC rapid charging, which relies on a high-bandwidth IP link provided by the HomePlug Green PHY (HPGP) power-line communication (PLC) technology to exchange important messages such as the State of Charge (SoC) with the Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE). The attack interrupts necessary control communication between the vehicle and charger, causing charging sessions to abort. This can be conducted wirelessly from a distance using electromagnetic interference, allowing individual vehicles or entire fleets to be disrupted simultaneously. The attack can be mounted with off-the-shelf radio hardware and minimal technical knowledge, and with a power budget of 1 W, it is successful from around 47 m distance. The exploited behavior is a required part of the HomePlug Green PHY, DIN 70121 & ISO 15118 standards, and all known implementations exhibit it. In addition to electric cars, this issue affects electric ships, airplanes, and heavy-duty vehicles utilizing these standards. **Recommendations** At the moment, there is no information about a newer version that contains a fix for this vulnerability.