Neo-Ai-Engineer

#1488of 53,625
149.8Total CVSS
Vulnerabilities · 20
Medium
9
High
5
Critical
6
PT-2026-24753
9.1
2026-03-11
Npm · @Siteboon/Claudecodeui · CVE-2026-31862
**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** Cloud CLI versions prior to 1.24.0 **Description** Cloud CLI (also known as Claude Code UI) is a desktop and mobile UI for Claude Code, Cursor CLI, Codex, and Gemini-CLI. Multiple Git-related API endpoints utilize `execAsync()` with string interpolation of user-controlled parameters – specifically `file`, `branch`, `message`, and `commit` – enabling authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary operating system commands. The application attempts to escape double quotes in some parameters, but this protection can be bypassed using shell metacharacters like command substitution ($(command) or `command`) and command chaining (; , &&, ||). The following API endpoints are affected: `/api/git/diff` (with the `file` parameter), `/api/git/status` (with the `file` parameter), `/api/git/commit` (with the `files` array and `message` parameter), `/api/git/checkout` (with the `branch` parameter), `/api/git/create-branch` (with the `branch` parameter), `/api/git/commits` (with the `commit` parameter), `/api/git/commit-diff` (with the `commit` parameter), `/api/git/file-with-diff` (with the `file` parameter), `/api/git/generate-commit-message` (with the `file` parameter), `/api/git/discard` (with the `file` parameter), and `/api/git/publish` (with the `branch` parameter). Successful exploitation could lead to remote code execution as the Node.js process user, potentially resulting in full server compromise and data exfiltration. **Recommendations** Update Cloud CLI to version 1.24.0 or later.
PT-2026-24752
8.8
2026-03-10
Npm · @Siteboon/Claude-Code-Ui · CVE-2026-31861
**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** Cloud CLI versions prior to 1.24.0 **Description** Cloud CLI (also known as Claude Code UI) is a desktop and mobile UI for Claude Code, Cursor CLI, Codex, and Gemini-CLI. The `/api/user/git-config` endpoint constructs shell commands using user-provided `gitName` and `gitEmail` values, passing them to `child process.exec()`. Input is placed within double quotes, but only double quotes are escaped, leaving backticks (`), `$()` command substitution, and `` sequences vulnerable to interpretation within bash. This allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary operating system commands through the git configuration endpoint. The vulnerable code resides in `server/routes/user.js` (lines 58-59). Exploitation involves injecting malicious commands via the `gitName` parameter using command substitution, potentially leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE) as the Node.js process user. The server-wide git configuration can be modified, impacting all git operations. When combined with a bypass for JWT authentication, this can result in unauthenticated RCE. **Recommendations** Versions prior to 1.24.0 should be updated to version 1.24.0 or later. Replace `exec()` with `spawn()` using array arguments to avoid shell interpretation. For example, instead of: `await execAsync(`git config --global user.name "${gitName.replace(/"/g, '"')}"`);` use: `await spawnAsync('git', ['config', '--global', 'user.name', gitName]);`.