Redyank

#3681of 53,624
70.6Total CVSS
Vulnerabilities · 9
Medium
2
High
6
Critical
1
PT-2026-26201
8.1
2026-03-18
Cycler · Cycler · CVE-2026-33154
**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** dynaconf versions prior to 3.2.13 **Description** dynaconf is susceptible to Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) due to insecure template evaluation within the @Jinja resolver. When the `jinja2` package is installed, Dynaconf evaluates template expressions embedded in configuration values without a sandboxed environment. Attackers influencing configuration sources—such as environment variables, `.env` files, container environment configuration, or CI/CD secrets—can execute arbitrary OS commands on the host system. The @format resolver also allows object graph traversal, potentially exposing sensitive runtime objects and environment variables. A proof-of-concept (PoC) demonstrates command execution using the `cycler` object to access Python’s `os` module and execute commands. Successful exploitation can lead to arbitrary OS command execution, access to sensitive environment variables, compromise of application secrets, and full compromise of the running application process. The vulnerability can be remotely exploitable in real-world deployments due to the potential for configuration values to originate from CI/CD pipelines, container orchestration systems, or environment injection. **Recommendations** versions prior to 3.2.13: Upgrade to version 3.2.13 or later to address the vulnerability. versions prior to 3.2.13: Use Jinja2 sandbox for template rendering. versions prior to 3.2.13: Restrict @format usage to trusted values.
PT-2026-23443
5.5
2026-03-05
Unknown · Eml-Parser · CVE-2026-29780
**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** eml parser versions prior to 2.0.1 **Description** The eml parser module, used for parsing eml files, contains a path traversal issue in the example script `examples/recursively extract attachments.py`. This allows for arbitrary file write outside the intended output directory. Attachment filenames extracted from parsed emails are directly used to construct output file paths without sanitization. An attacker-controlled filename can escape the target directory by crafting email attachment headers, such as setting the `Content-Disposition` header with a filename like `../outside/pwned.txt`. The vulnerable code is located in lines 61-64 of the `examples/recursively extract attachments.py` script, where the `a['filename']` variable is used directly to construct the output file path. The vulnerability is limited to the example script and does not affect the core eml parser library. Potential attack scenarios include cron job injection, web shell upload, and SSH key injection. The vulnerable parameter is `a['filename']`. **Recommendations** Versions prior to 2.0.1 should be updated to version 2.0.1 or later. As a temporary workaround, implement path normalization and boundary validation before writing files. Specifically, use `os.path.basename()` to extract the filename and ensure the resulting path is relative to the intended output directory using `out filepath.resolve().is relative to(out path.resolve())`.