Sander Horsman

**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** Fluent Forms versions prior to 6.1.22 **Description** An authorization bypass exists in the `SubmissionPolicy` class, which authorizes submission-level actions such as reading, modifying, deleting, and adding notes based on a user-supplied `form id` query parameter. Authenticated attackers with Fluent Forms Manager access restricted to specific forms can spoof the `form id` parameter to access, modify the status of, add notes to, or permanently delete form submissions belonging to any other form. **Recommendations** Update to version 6.1.22 or later.

**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** Fluent Forms – Customizable Contact Forms, Survey, Quiz, & Conversational Form Builder versions prior to 6.2.1 **Description** An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) exists in the `exportEntries()` function due to missing validation on a user-controlled key. This allows authenticated attackers with manager-level access or higher to bypass form-level restrictions to access unauthorized form submissions, export data from arbitrary database tables, and enumerate database table names through error message disclosure. **Recommendations** Update to a version later than 6.2.0. As a temporary workaround, restrict access to the `exportEntries()` function for users with manager-level permissions until the update is applied.

The MW WP Form plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Move/Read in all versions up to and including 5.1.1. This is due to insufficient validation of the $name parameter (upload field key) passed to the generate user file dirpath() function, which uses WordPress's path join() — a function that returns absolute paths unchanged, discarding the intended base directory. The attacker-controlled key is injected via the mwf upload files[] POST parameter, which is loaded into the plugin's Data model via set request valiables(). During form processing, regenerate upload file keys() iterates over these keys and calls generate user filepath() with the attacker-supplied key as the $name argument — the key survives validation because the targeted file (e.g., wp-config.php) genuinely exists at the absolute path. The get attachments() method then re-reads the same surviving keys and passes the resolved file path to move temp file to upload dir(), which calls rename() to move the file into the uploads folder. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to move arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is moved (such as wp-config.php). The vulnerability is only exploitable if a file upload field is added to the form and the “Saving inquiry data in database” option is enabled.