Yardenporat353

#5281of 53,633
50.3Total CVSS
Vulnerabilities · 6
Medium
1
High
3
Critical
2
PT-2026-39304
8.2
2026-05-08
Pypi · Langchain · CVE-2026-44843
**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** langchain versions prior to 0.3.27 **Description** LangChain contains runtime code paths that deserialize inputs, outputs, or other application-controlled payloads using overly broad object allowlists, specifically calling `load()` with `allowed objects="all"`. This allows attacker-supplied serialized constructor dictionaries to instantiate trusted classes with untrusted arguments. This issue can lead to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), enabling access to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, or sensitive network resources, which may result in credential theft and persistent supply-chain compromise. Applications are exposed if they accept untrusted structured input (such as JSON) without validation, preserve attacker-controlled nested dictionaries or lists in run data, and use affected API paths. Known affected surfaces include the `RunnableWithMessageHistory` class, the `astream log()` function, and the `astream events(version="v1")` function. Additionally, a secret-marker validation bypass in the ` is lc secret` function allows constructor dictionaries to avoid escaping during `dumps()` to `loads()` round-trips. **Recommendations** Update langchain to version 0.3.27. Migrate away from the deprecated `RunnableWithMessageHistory` class, `astream log()` function, and `astream events(version="v1")` function in favor of newer streaming and memory patterns, such as the `stream` API. Use `load()` and `loads()` only with trusted manifests or objects from trusted storage; do not pass user-controlled data to these functions. When using `load()` or `loads()`, provide a narrow `allowed objects` value instead of relying on broad defaults or `allowed objects="all"`.
PT-2026-23498
7.2
2026-03-05
Langgraph · Langgraph · CVE-2026-28277
**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** LangGraph versions 1.0.9 and earlier **Description** LangGraph checkpointers can load msgpack-encoded checkpoints that reconstruct Python objects during deserialization. If an attacker gains privileged write access to the checkpoint data store (e.g., after a database compromise), they could supply a crafted payload that triggers unsafe object reconstruction when the checkpoint is loaded. This is considered a post-exploitation issue, potentially allowing an attacker to escalate from write access to the checkpoint store to code execution within the application runtime, potentially exposing runtime secrets or providing access to other systems. Exploitation requires the ability to write attacker-controlled checkpoint bytes at rest. There is no evidence of exploitation in the wild. The issue can lead to arbitrary code execution or other unsafe side effects during checkpoint deserialization. The vulnerability requires the attacker to be able to modify persisted checkpoint bytes or compromise a trusted component that writes them. **Recommendations** Enable strict mode by setting the environment variable `LANGGRAPH STRICT MSGPACK` to a truthy value (e.g., '1', 'true', 'yes'). Configure the `allowed msgpack modules` setting to `None` for strict mode, or to a list of explicitly allowed modules and class names. Restrict write access to checkpoint stores and rotate credentials if a compromise is suspected. Avoid providing custom msgpack deserialization hooks that reconstruct arbitrary types unless checkpoint data is fully trusted.