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#1483of 53,633
150Total CVSS
Vulnerabilities · 20
Medium
6
High
12
Critical
2
PT-2026-25011
7.4
2026-03-12
Git · Tinacms · CVE-2026-28791
**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** Tina versions prior to 2.1.7 @tinacms/cli versions prior to 2.0.5 **Description** Tina is a headless content management system. A path traversal vulnerability exists in the TinaCMS development server's media upload handler. The code at `media.ts` joins user-controlled path segments using `path.join()` without validating that the resulting path remains within the intended media directory. This allows writing files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem. The vulnerability is present in the `handlePost`, `handleDelete`, `handleList`, `MediaModel.listMedia`, and `MediaModel.deleteMedia` functions. Similar code also exists in the Express version. The vulnerability could potentially lead to remote code execution, denial of service, or information disclosure. The vulnerable code is located in `packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/commands/dev-command/server/media.ts` lines 42-43. The `path.join()` function resolves `..` segments in the path, and when the user-supplied path contains traversal sequences, these are resolved relative to the media folder, allowing escape to arbitrary filesystem locations. **Recommendations** Versions prior to 2.1.7: Add path validation to ensure the resolved path stays within the media directory. Versions prior to 2.0.5: Add path validation to ensure the resolved path stays within the media directory. Consider creating a validation helper function to ensure consistent path validation across all affected functions and endpoints. Apply the fix to the `handleDelete` function, `handleList` function, `MediaModel.listMedia` method, `MediaModel.deleteMedia` method, and the Express router in `packages/@tinacms/cli/src/server/`.
PT-2026-23788
7.7
2026-03-06
Flowise · Flowise · CVE-2026-30822
**Flowise and Affected Versions** Flowise versions prior to 3.0.13 **Description** Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. A mass assignment issue exists in the `/api/v1/leads` endpoint, allowing unauthenticated users to control internal entity fields (`id`, `createdDate`, `chatId`) by including them in the request body. The endpoint uses `Object.assign()` to copy all properties from the request body to the Lead entity without input validation or field filtering. This allows attackers to bypass auto-generated fields and inject arbitrary values. The vulnerability exists in `/packages/server/src/services/leads/index.ts` at lines 27-28. The Lead entity definition at `/packages/server/src/database/entities/Lead.ts` uses TypeORM decorators that should auto-generate these fields, but `Object.assign()` overwrites these fields before they are saved. The `/api/v1/leads` endpoint is publicly accessible due to its inclusion in a whitelist in `/packages/server/src/utils/constants.ts`. Attack scenarios include ID collision attacks, audit trail manipulation, data integrity violations, and chatflow association manipulation. **Recommendations** Versions prior to 3.0.13: Implement a fix to whitelist allowed fields during object assignment, only copying explicitly permitted fields from the request body. Alternatively, use destructuring with explicit fields or utilize class-transformer with `@Exclude()` decorators to prevent assignment of sensitive fields from the request. Consider applying the same fix to other endpoints that use `Object.assign()` with request bodies, such as `/packages/server/src/utils/addChatMessageFeedback.ts`.