PT-2025-35524 · Pypi · Picklescan

Published

2025-08-22

·

Updated

2025-08-22

None

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Summary

Using torch.utils.bottleneck. main .run cprofile function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file.

Details

The attack payload executes in the following steps:
First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch.utils.bottleneck. main .run cprofile function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.

PoC

import torch.utils.bottleneck. main  as bottleneck main

class EvilTorchUtilsBottleneckRunCprofile:
  def  reduce (self):
    code = ' import ("os").system("whoami")'
    globs = {}
    return bottleneck main.run cprofile, (code, globs)

Impact

Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.

Corresponding

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

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Weakness Enumeration

Related Identifiers

GHSA-4R9R-CH6F-VXMX

Affected Products

Picklescan