PT-2025-42826 · Go · Github.Com/Microstack-Tech/Parallax

Published

2025-10-10

·

Updated

2025-10-10

CVSS v3.1

7.5

High

VectorAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Impact

A vulnerable node can be made to consume very large amounts of memory when handling specially crafted p2p messages sent from an attacker node.
In order to carry out the attack, the attacker establishes a peer connections to the victim, and sends a malicious GetBlockHeadersRequest message with a count of 0, using the Parallax protocol.
In descendants := chain.GetHeadersFrom(num+count-1, count-1), the value of count-1 is passed to the function GetHeadersFrom(number, count uint64) as parameter count. Due to integer overflow, UINT64 MAX value is then passed as the count argument to function GetHeadersFrom(number, count uint64). This allows an attacker to bypass maxHeadersServe and request all headers from the latest block back to the genesis block.

Patches

The fix has been included in the Parallax client version 0.1.4 and onwards.

Workarounds

No workarounds have been made public.

Credit

This issue was disclosed responsibly by DongHan Kim via the Ethereum bug bounty program, the cooperation is appreciated.

Fix

Resource Exhaustion

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Weakness Enumeration

Related Identifiers

GHSA-XC79-566C-J4QX

Affected Products

Github.Com/Microstack-Tech/Parallax