PT-2026-25842 · Npm · @Dicebear/Converter

Published

2026-03-16

·

Updated

2026-03-16

·

CVE-2026-29112

CVSS v3.1
7.5
VectorAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Impact

The 
ensureSize()
function in 
@dicebear/converter
(versions < 9.4.0) read the 
width
and 
height
attributes from the input SVG to determine the output canvas size for rasterization (PNG, JPEG, WebP, AVIF). An attacker who can supply a crafted SVG with extremely large dimensions (e.g. 
width="999999999"
) could force the server to allocate excessive memory, leading to denial of service.
This primarily affects server-side applications that pass untrusted or user-supplied SVGs to the converter's 
toPng()
, 
toJpeg()
, 
toWebp()
, or 
toAvif()
functions. Applications that only convert self-generated DiceBear avatars are not practically exploitable, but are still recommended to upgrade.

Patches

Fixed in version 9.4.0. The 
ensureSize()
function no longer reads SVG attributes to determine output size. Instead, a new 
size
option (default: 512, max: 2048) controls the output dimensions. Invalid values (NaN, negative, zero, Infinity) fall back to the default.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, validate and sanitize the 
width
and 
height
attributes of any untrusted SVG input before passing it to the converter.

Fix

Allocation of Resources Without Limits

Weakness Enumeration

CWE-770

Related Identifiers

CVE-2026-29112
GHSA-V3R3-4QGC-VW66

Affected Products

@Dicebear/Converter