PT-2026-25849 · Pypi · Glance

Published

2026-03-16

·

Updated

2026-03-16

·

CVE-2026-32611

CVSS v3.1
7.0
VectorAV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L

Summary

The GHSA-x46r fix (commit 39161f0) addressed SQL injection in the TimescaleDB export module by converting all SQL operations to use parameterized queries and 
psycopg.sql
composable objects. However, the DuckDB export module (
glances/exports/glances duckdb/ init .py
) was not included in this fix and contains the same class of vulnerability: table names and column names derived from monitoring statistics are directly interpolated into SQL statements via f-strings. While DuckDB INSERT values already use parameterized queries (
?
placeholders), the DDL construction and table name references do not escape or parameterize identifier names.

Details

The DuckDB export module constructs SQL DDL statements by directly interpolating stat field names and plugin names into f-strings.
Vulnerable CREATE TABLE construction (
glances/exports/glances duckdb/ init .py:156-162
):
create query = f"""
CREATE TABLE {plugin} (
{', '.join(creation list)}
);"""
self.client.execute(create query)
The 
creation list
is built from stat dictionary keys in the 
update()
method (
glances/exports/glances duckdb/ init .py:117-118
):
for key, value in plugin stats.items():
  creation list.append(f"{key} {convert types[type(self.normalize(value)). name ]}")
The INSERT statement also uses the unescaped 
plugin
name (
glances/exports/glances duckdb/ init .py:172-174
):
insert query = f"""
INSERT INTO {plugin} VALUES (
{', '.join(['?' for  in values])}
);"""
While INSERT values use 
?
placeholders (safe), the table name 
{plugin}
is directly interpolated in both CREATE TABLE and INSERT INTO statements. Column names in creation list are also directly interpolated without quoting.
Comparison with the TimescaleDB fix (commit 39161f0):
The TimescaleDB fix addressed this exact pattern by:
  1. Using 
    psycopg.sql.Identifier()
    for table and column names
  2. Using 
    psycopg.sql.SQL()
    for composing queries
  3. Using 
    %s
    placeholders for all values
The DuckDB module was not part of this fix despite having the same vulnerability class.
Attack vector:
The primary attack vector is through stat dictionary keys. While most keys come from hardcoded psutil field names (e.g., 
cpu percent
, 
memory usage
), any future plugin that introduces dynamic keys from external data (container labels, custom metrics, user-defined sensor names) would create an exploitable injection path. Additionally, the table name (
plugin
) comes from the internal plugins list, but any custom plugin with a crafted name could inject SQL.

PoC

The injection is demonstrable when column or table names contain SQL metacharacters:
# Simulated injection via a hypothetical plugin with dynamic keys
# If a stat dict contained a key like:
#  "cpu percent BIGINT); DROP TABLE cpu; --"
# The creation list would produce:
#  "cpu percent BIGINT); DROP TABLE cpu; -- VARCHAR"
# Which in the CREATE TABLE f-string becomes:
#  CREATE TABLE plugin name (
#   time TIMETZ,
#   hostname id VARCHAR,
#   cpu percent BIGINT); DROP TABLE cpu; -- VARCHAR
#  );
# Verify with DuckDB export enabled:
# 1. Configure DuckDB export in glances.conf:
# [duckdb]
# database=/tmp/glances.duckdb

# 2. Start Glances with DuckDB export and debug logging
glances --export duckdb --debug 2>&1 | grep "Create table"

# 3. Observe the unescaped SQL in debug output

Impact

  • Defense-in-depth gap: The identical vulnerability pattern was identified and fixed in TimescaleDB (GHSA-x46r) but the fix was not applied to the sibling DuckDB module. This represents an incomplete patch that leaves the same attack surface open through a different code path.
  • Future exploitability: If any Glances plugin is added or modified to produce stat dictionary keys from external/user-controlled data (e.g., container metadata, custom metric names, SNMP OID labels), the DuckDB export would become immediately exploitable for SQL injection without any additional code changes.
  • Data integrity: A successful injection in the CREATE TABLE statement could corrupt the DuckDB database, create unauthorized tables, or modify schema in ways that affect other applications reading from the same database file.

Recommended Fix

Apply the same parameterization approach used in the TimescaleDB fix. DuckDB supports identifier quoting with double quotes:
# glances/exports/glances duckdb/ init .py

def quote identifier(name):
  """Quote a SQL identifier to prevent injection."""
  # DuckDB uses double-quote escaping for identifiers
  return '"' + name.replace('"', '""') + '"'

def export(self, plugin, creation list, values list):
  """Export the stats to the DuckDB server."""
  logger.debug(f"Export {plugin} stats to DuckDB")

  table list = [t[0] for t in self.client.sql("SHOW TABLES").fetchall()]
  if plugin not in table list:
    # Quote table and column names to prevent injection
    quoted plugin = quote identifier(plugin)
    quoted fields = []
    for item in creation list:
      parts = item.split(' ', 1)
      col name = quote identifier(parts[0])
      col type = parts[1] if len(parts) > 1 else 'VARCHAR'
      quoted fields.append(f"{col name} {col type}")

    create query = f"CREATE TABLE {quoted plugin} ({', '.join(quoted fields)});"
    try:
      self.client.execute(create query)
    except Exception as e:
      logger.error(f"Cannot create table {plugin}: {e}")
      return

  self.client.commit()

  # Insert with quoted table name
  quoted plugin = quote identifier(plugin)
  for values in values list:
    insert query = f"INSERT INTO {quoted plugin} VALUES ({', '.join(['?' for  in values])});"
    try:
      self.client.execute(insert query, values)
    except Exception as e:
      logger.error(f"Cannot insert data into table {plugin}: {e}")

  self.client.commit()

Fix

SQL injection

Weakness Enumeration

CWE-89

Related Identifiers

CVE-2026-32611
GHSA-49G7-2WW7-3VF5

Affected Products

Glance