PT-2026-28181 · Pypi · Openhands

Published

2026-03-25

·

Updated

2026-03-25

·

CVE-2026-33718

CVSS v3.1

7.6

High

AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L

Summary

A Command Injection vulnerability exists in the get git diff() method at openhands/runtime/utils/git handler.py:134. The path parameter from the /api/conversations/{conversation id}/git/diff API endpoint is passed unsanitized to a shell command, allowing authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary commands in the agent sandbox. The user is already allowed to instruct the agent to execute commands, but this bypasses the normal channels.

Details

Vulnerable Code Path

The vulnerability flows through these files:
  1. API Endpoint (openhands/server/routes/files.py:267-277)
@app.get('/git/diff')
async def git diff(
  path: str, # <-- User input from HTTP request
  ...
):
  ...
  diff = await call sync from async(runtime.get git diff, path, cwd) # No sanitization
  1. Runtime (openhands/runtime/base.py:1231-1233)
def get git diff(self, file path: str, cwd: str) -> dict[str, str]:
  self.git handler.set cwd(cwd)
  return self.git handler.get git diff(file path) # Passed directly
  1. Vulnerable Method (openhands/runtime/utils/git handler.py:10-12, 134)
# Command template with placeholder
GIT DIFF CMD = 'python3 /openhands/code/openhands/runtime/utils/git diff.py "{file path}"'

# Line 134 - VULNERABLE: User input directly interpolated
result = self.execute(self.git diff cmd.format(file path=file path), self.cwd)
  1. Shell Execution (openhands/runtime/utils/git diff.py:25-27)
def run(cmd: str, cwd: str) -> str:
  result = subprocess.run(
    args=cmd,
    shell=True, # <-- Enables shell metacharacter interpretation
    stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
    stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
    cwd=cwd
  )

Root Cause

The file path parameter is directly interpolated into a shell command string using Python's .format() method without any sanitization. When this command is executed with shell=True, shell metacharacters like ", ;, and # are interpreted, allowing command injection.
Example:
  • Input: test"; id #
  • Constructed command: python3 /script.py "test"; id #"
  • Shell interprets as two commands: python3 /script.py "test" AND id

Impact

Who is Affected

  • All OpenHands deployments exposing the /api/conversations/{id}/git/diff endpoint
  • Any authenticated user can exploit this vulnerability,

Attack Capabilities

An attacker can:
  1. Execute arbitrary commands on the runtime container as root
  2. Read sensitive files including .env, API keys, source code
  3. Write arbitrary files to inject malicious code
  4. Establish reverse shells for persistent access
  5. Potentially escape the container if Docker is misconfigured

Mitigation

Users should update to the latest version of OpenHands that includes the changes from PR #13051. The fix replaces direct shell string formatting with proper argument array handling or rigorous path sanitization to prevent command chaining.

Fix

OS Command Injection

Weakness Enumeration

CWE-78

Related Identifiers

CVE-2026-33718
GHSA-7H8W-HJ9J-8RJW

Affected Products

Openhands