PT-2026-30199 · Pypi · Vllm
Published
2026-04-03
·
Updated
2026-04-03
·
CVE-2026-34756
CVSS v3.1
6.5
Medium
| AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H |
Summary
A Denial of Service vulnerability exists in the vLLM OpenAI-compatible API server. Due to the lack of an upper bound validation on the
n parameter in the ChatCompletionRequest and CompletionRequest Pydantic models, an unauthenticated attacker can send a single HTTP request with an astronomically large n value. This completely blocks the Python asyncio event loop and causes immediate Out-Of-Memory crashes by allocating millions of request object copies in the heap before the request even reaches the scheduling queue.Details
The root cause of this vulnerability lies in the missing upper bound checks across the request parsing and asynchronous scheduling layers:
- Protocol Layer:
In
vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat completion/protocol.py, thenparameter is defined simply as an integer without anypydantic.Fieldconstraints for an upper bound.
class ChatCompletionRequest(OpenAIBaseModel):
# Ordered by official OpenAI API documentation
# https://platform.openai.com/docs/api/reference/chat/create
messages: list[ChatCompletionMessageParam]
model: str | None = None
frequency penalty: float | None = 0.0
logit bias: dict[str, float] | None = None
logprobs: bool | None = False
top logprobs: int | None = 0
max tokens: int | None = Field(
default=None,
deprecated="max tokens is deprecated in favor of "
"the max completion tokens field",
)
max completion tokens: int | None = None
n: int | None = 1
presence penalty: float | None = 0.0
- SamplingParams Layer (Incomplete Validation):
When the API request is converted to internal
SamplingParamsinvllm/sampling params.py, theverify argsmethod only checks the lower bound (self.n < 1), entirely omitting an upper bounds check.
def verify args(self) -> None:
if not isinstance(self.n, int):
raise ValueError(f"n must be an int, but is of type {type(self.n)}")
if self.n < 1:
raise ValueError(f"n must be at least 1, got {self.n}.")
- Engine Layer (The OOM Trigger):
When the malicious request reaches the core engine (
vllm/v1/engine/async llm.py), the engine attempts to fan out the requestntimes to generate identical independent sequences within a synchronous loop.
# Fan out child requests (for n>1).
parent request = ParentRequest(request)
for idx in range(parent params.n):
request id, child params = parent request.get child info(idx)
child request = request if idx == parent params.n - 1 else copy(request)
child request.request id = request id
child request.sampling params = child params
await self. add request(
child request, prompt text, parent request, idx, queue
)
return queue
Because Python's
asyncio runs on a single thread and event loop, this monolithic for-loop monopolizes the CPU thread. The server stops responding to all other connections (including liveness probes). Simultaneously, the memory allocator is overwhelmed by cloning millions of request object instances via copy(request), driving the host's Resident Set Size (RSS) up by gigabytes per second until the OS OOM-killer terminates the vLLM process.Impact
Vulnerability Type: Resource Exhaustion / Denial of Service
Impacted Parties:
- Any individual or organization hosting a public-facing vLLM API server (
vllm.entrypoints.openai.api server), which happens to be the primary entrypoint for OpenAI-compatible setups. - SaaS / AI-as-a-Service platforms acting as reverse proxies sitting in front of vLLM without strict HTTP body payload validation or rate limitations.
Because this vulnerability exploits the control plane rather than the data plane, an unauthenticated remote attacker can achieve a high success rate in taking down production inference hosts with a single HTTP request. This effectively circumvents any hardware-level capacity planning and conventional bandwidth stress limitations.
Fix
Allocation of Resources Without Limits
Found an issue in the description? Have something to add? Feel free to write us 👾
Weakness Enumeration
Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Vllm