PT-2026-30682 · Npm · Postiz
Published
2026-03-27
·
Updated
2026-03-27
CVSS v4.0
7.8
High
| Vector | AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N |
Summary
Postiz has multiple SSRF vulnerabilities where user-provided URLs are fetched server-side without any IP validation or SSRF protection.
Vulnerable Code
1. Webhook Send Endpoint (Most Critical)
apps/backend/src/api/routes/webhooks.controller.ts lines 58-70:typescript
async sendWebhook(@Body() body: any, @Query('url') url: string) {
try {
await fetch(url, { // No URL validation
method: 'POST',
body: JSON.stringify(body),
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
});
} catch (err) { }
return { send: true };
}Accepts arbitrary URL via query parameter and fetches directly.
2. Stored Webhook Delivery
apps/orchestrator/src/activities/post.activity.ts lines 256-281:typescript
async sendWebhooks(postId: string, orgId: string, integrationId: string) {
const webhooks = await this. webhookService.getWebhooks(orgId);
return Promise.all(
webhooks.map(async (webhook) => {
await fetch(webhook.url, { // Stored URL, no validation
method: 'POST',
body: JSON.stringify(post),
});
})
);
}3. RSS/XML Feed Parser
libraries/nestjs-libraries/src/database/prisma/autopost/autopost.service.ts line 135:typescript
async loadXML(url: string) {
const { items } = await parser.parseURL(url); // No URL validation
}4. HTML Content Loader
libraries/nestjs-libraries/src/database/prisma/autopost/autopost.service.ts line 185:typescript
async loadUrl(url: string) {
const loadDom = new JSDOM(await (await fetch(url)).text()); // No validation
}Missing Protections
- No
request-filtering-agentor SSRF library - No private IP range filtering
- No cloud metadata endpoint blocking
- No DNS rebinding protection
- URL validation only via
@IsUrl()decorator (format only, no IP check)
Attack Scenarios
POST /webhooks/send?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/→ AWS metadata theftPOST /autopost/send?url=http://127.0.0.1:6379→ Internal Redis access- Create webhook with
http://10.0.0.1:8080/admin→ Internal service access on post publish
Impact
- Cloud metadata theft: AWS/GCP/Azure credentials
- Internal network scanning: Full access to private IP ranges
- Multiple entry points: Webhooks, RSS feeds, URL loader all vulnerable
Fix
SSRF
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Weakness Enumeration
Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Postiz