PT-2026-35121 · Go · Github.Com/Oxia-Db/Oxia

Published 2026-04-14 · Updated 2026-04-14

OSV

CVSS v4.0

8.7

High

Base vector

AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Summary

When OIDC authentication fails, the full bearer token is logged at DEBUG level in plaintext. If debug logging is enabled in production, JWT tokens are exposed in application logs and any connected log aggregation system.

Impact

An attacker with access to application logs (e.g., via a compromised log aggregation pipeline, shared logging infrastructure, or misconfigured log access controls) can extract valid JWT tokens and replay them to authenticate as legitimate users.

All versions using OIDC authentication are affected.

Details

In oxiad/common/rpc/auth/interceptor.go, the validateTokenWithContext() function logs the complete token value via slog.String("token", token) when authentication fails. This includes the full JWT header, payload, and signature.

Patches

Fixed by redacting the token in log output — only the last 8 characters are preserved for correlation purposes.

Workarounds

Ensure DEBUG-level logging is never enabled in production environments.

Fix

Insertion into Log File

Weakness Enumeration

CWE-532

Related Identifiers

GHSA-PM7Q-RJJX-979P

Affected Products

Github.Com/Oxia-Db/Oxia

References · 5

• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40945 · Security Note
• https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-pm7q-rjjx-979p · Vendor Advisory
• https://github.com/oxia-db/oxia/security/advisories/GHSA-pm7q-rjjx-979p · Note
• https://github.com/oxia-db/oxia · Note
• https://github.com/oxia-db/oxia/commit/f7259d0ebc739fc95ff19f93c823433850857416 · Note