PT-2026-35369 · Apache · Apache Camel Pqc
Andrea Cosentino
+1
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Published
2026-04-27
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Updated
2026-04-27
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CVE-2026-40048
None
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The Camel-PQC FileBasedKeyLifecycleManager class deserializes the contents of
<keyId>.key files in the configured key directory using java.io.ObjectInputStream without applying any ObjectInputFilter or class-loading restrictions. The cast to java.security.KeyPair is evaluated only after readObject() has already returned, so any readObject() side effects in the deserialized object run before the type check. An attacker who can write to the key directory used by a Camel application — for example through a path traversal into the directory, misconfigured filesystem permissions on the volume where keys are stored, a compromised key provisioning pipeline, or a symlink attack — can place a crafted serialized Java object that, when deserialized during normal key lifecycle operations, results in arbitrary code execution in the context of the application.This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.19.0 before 4.20.0, from 4.18.0 before 4.18.2.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.20.0, which fixes the issue by replacing java.io.ObjectInputStream-based key and metadata storage with standard PKCS#8 (private key) / X.509 SubjectPublicKeyInfo (public key) Base64 JSON encoding. For users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream, upgrade to 4.18.2.
Deserialization of Untrusted Data
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Weakness Enumeration
Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Apache Camel Pqc