PT-2026-37285 · Pypi · Firefighter-Incident

Published

2026-05-05

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Updated

2026-05-05

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CVE-2026-42864

CVSS v3.1

9.9

Critical

VectorAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L

Impact

The POST /api/v2/firefighter/raid/jira bot endpoint (CreateJiraBotView) is reachable without authentication (permission classes = [permissions.AllowAny]). Its attachments payload is fetched server-side via httpx.get() with no URL validation, then uploaded as an attachment on the Jira ticket that gets created.
An unauthenticated caller able to reach the ingress can coerce the pod into fetching arbitrary URLs — including the cloud metadata endpoint at http://169.254.169.254/ — and exfiltrate the response as a Jira attachment.
On EC2/EKS deployments that do not enforce IMDSv2, this allows theft of the temporary AWS credentials attached to the pod's IAM role. The docstring on the view claims a Bearer token is required, but the code does not enforce it.
Affected code paths:
  • src/firefighter/raid/views/ init .py — CreateJiraBotView
  • src/firefighter/raid/serializers.py — LandbotIssueRequestSerializer.attachments
  • src/firefighter/raid/client.py — RaidJiraClient.add attachments to issue

Patches

Fixed in firefighter-incident 0.0.54:
  • CreateJiraBotView now enforces BearerTokenAuthentication + IsAuthenticated.
  • attachments URLs are validated: http(s) scheme only, max 10 URLs, rejection of any host resolving to a private, loopback, link-local, reserved, multicast or unspecified IP (IPv4 and IPv6).
  • Fixes an unrelated KeyError('attachments') surfaced during regression testing.
Users should upgrade to 0.0.54 or later.

Workarounds

Until upgrade is possible, any one of the following blocks end-to-end exploitation:
  • Restrict ingress access to /api/v2/firefighter/raid/jira bot to trusted networks only (VPN, internal load balancer).
  • Rotate or revoke the Jira API token configured as RAID JIRA API PASSWORD; this breaks jira.create issue() before the vulnerable attachment fetch is reached (legitimate traffic is also blocked — emergency mitigation only).
  • Enforce IMDSv2 with HttpPutResponseHopLimit=1 on EC2/EKS nodes. This does not fix the SSRF itself but neutralises the IAM-credential-theft path.

Resources

  • CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery
  • CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function

Fix

Missing Authentication

SSRF

Weakness Enumeration

CWE-306CWE-918

Related Identifiers

CVE-2026-42864
GHSA-FQVV-JVHR-G5JC

Affected Products

Firefighter-Incident