PT-2026-38410 · Pypi · Diffusers
Published
2026-05-07
·
Updated
2026-05-07
·
CVE-2026-44513
CVSS v3.1
8.8
High
| Vector | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
Impact
A
trust remote code bypass in DiffusionPipeline.from pretrained allows arbitrary remote code execution despite the user passing trust remote code=False (or omitting it, which is the default). The vulnerability has three variants, all sharing the same root cause — the trust remote code gate was implemented inside DiffusionPipeline.download() rather than at the actual dynamic-module load site, so any code path that bypassed or short-circuited download() also bypassed the security check:- Cross-repo
custom pipeline.DiffusionPipeline.from pretrained('repoA', custom pipeline='attacker/repoB', trust remote code=False)— the gate evaluated againstrepoA's file list rather thanrepoB's, sorepoB'spipeline.pywas loaded and executed. - Local snapshot + Hub
custom pipeline.DiffusionPipeline.from pretrained('/local/snapshot', custom pipeline='attacker/repoB', trust remote code=False)— the local-path branch never invokeddownload(), so the gate was never reached and remote code fromrepoBexecuted. - Local snapshot with custom components.
DiffusionPipeline.from pretrained('/local/snapshot', trust remote code=False)where the snapshot contains custom component files (e.g.unet/my unet model.py) referenced frommodel index.json— same root cause; the local path skippeddownload()and custom component code executed.
Silent remote code execution on the victim's machine. Anyone calling
DiffusionPipeline.from pretrained with custom pipelines is impacted.Patches
Yes. Fixed in diffusers 0.38.0 via PR #13448. All users on versions
< 0.38.0 should upgrade:pip install --upgrade "diffusers>=0.38.0"
The fix moves the
trust remote code gate out of DiffusionPipeline.download() and into get cached module file in src/diffusers/utils/dynamic modules utils.py, which is the actual chokepoint for every dynamic module load (local, Hub, or community mirror). All three variants now raise ValueError instead of executing untrusted code.Workarounds
If upgrading immediately is not possible:
- Only call
from pretrainedwithpretrained model name or path,custom pipeline, and local snapshot directories from fully trusted sources that have been audited. - Do not pass
custom pipeline=pointing at a Hub repository different from the primarypretrained model name or pathbefore reading itspipeline.py. - Before calling
from pretrainedon a local snapshot, inspect the snapshot for unexpected*.pyfiles, especially under component subdirectories (unet/,scheduler/, etc.) and at the snapshot root.
These are mitigations, not fixes — the only complete remediation is upgrading to 0.38.0.
Resources
Fix
Code Injection
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Weakness Enumeration
Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Diffusers