PT-2026-38539 · Crates.Io · Hickory-Net
Published
2026-05-01
·
Updated
2026-05-01
None
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The NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation in
hickory-net's
DnssecDnsHandle walks from the QNAME up to the SOA owner name, building a
list of candidate encloser names. The iterator used assumes the
QNAME is a descendant of the SOA owner, terminating only when the current
candidate equals the SOA name. When the SOA in a response's authority section
is not an ancestor of the QNAME, the loop stalls at the DNS root and never
terminates, repeatedly calling Name::base name() and pushing newly allocated
Name and hashed-name entries into the candidate Vec.The bug is reachable by any caller of
DnssecDnsHandle — including the
resolver, recursor, and client — when built with the dnssec-ring or
dnssec-aws-lc-rs feature and configured to perform DNSSEC validation. It is
triggered while validating a NoData or NXDomain response whose authority
section contains an SOA record from a zone other than an ancestor of the
QNAME, on a code path that requires NSEC3 closest-encloser proof. In practice
this can be reached through an insecure CNAME chain that crosses zone
boundaries into a DNSSEC-signed zone returning NoData, but the minimum
condition is just a mismatched SOA owner on a response requiring NSEC3
validation.A
debug assert ne!(name, Name::root()) guards the loop body, so debug builds
abort with a panic on the first iteration past the root. Release builds
compile the assertion out and run the loop unbounded, allocating until the
process exhausts available memory (OOM). A reachable upstream attacker who
can return such a response can therefore crash a debug-built validator or
exhaust memory on a release-built one.We recommend all affected users update to
hickory-net 0.26.1 for the fix. Found an issue in the description? Have something to add? Feel free to write us 👾
Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Hickory-Net