PT-2026-40058 · Undefined · Undefined

Published

2026-05-12

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Updated

2026-05-12

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CVE-2026-31219

CVSS v3.1

8.8

High

VectorAV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
The load model() function in the neural magic training.py script of the optimate project in commit a6d302f912b481c94370811af6b11402f51d377f (2024-07-21) is vulnerable to insecure deserialization (CWE-502). When a user provides a single model file path (e.g., .pt or .pth) via the --model command-line argument, the function loads the file using torch.load() without enabling the weights only=True security parameter. This allows the deserialization of arbitrary Python objects through the Pickle module. A remote attacker can exploit this by providing a maliciously crafted model file, leading to arbitrary code execution during deserialization on the victim's system.

Fix

Deserialization of Untrusted Data

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Weakness Enumeration

Related Identifiers

CVE-2026-31219

Affected Products

Undefined