PT-2026-41401 · Packagist · Getgrav/Grav
Published
2026-05-05
·
Updated
2026-05-05
CVSS v3.1
6.5
Medium
| Vector | AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N |
Dear Grav Security Team,
A security vulnerability was discovered in Grav CMS that allows authenticated attackers to read arbitrary files from the server through XML External Entity (XXE) injection.
Vulnerability Summary
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Vulnerability Type | XML External Entity (XXE) Injection |
| Severity | High (CVSS 7.5) |
| Affected Versions | Grav CMS <= 1.7.x |
| Affected Component | SVG file upload/processing |
| CWE | CWE-611: Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference |
| Authentication Required | Yes (Admin panel access) |
Technical Details
Root Cause
The application uses
simplexml load string() to process uploaded SVG files without disabling external entity loading. This allows attackers to inject XXE payloads that are processed by the XML parser.Vulnerable Code Pattern
php
// Current (Vulnerable):
$svg = simplexml load string($content);
// No LIBXML NOENT flag or entity loader protectionAttack Vector
- Attacker authenticates to Grav admin panel
- Uploads malicious SVG file via Pages → Media or File Manager plugin
- Server parses SVG and processes XXE entities
- Arbitrary file contents are exfiltrated
Impact
An authenticated attacker can:
- Read sensitive files:
/etc/passwd- System user informationuser/accounts/*.yaml- Admin credentials and 2FA secretsuser/config/system.yaml- System configuration.envfiles - Environment secrets and API keys
-
Perform SSRF - Access internal services via external entity URLs
-
Potential DoS - Billion laughs attack via recursive entity expansion
Proof of Concept
Malicious SVG Payload
xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE svg [
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="100" height="100">
<text x="10" y="50">&xxe;</text>
</svg>Steps to Reproduce
- Login to Grav CMS admin panel
- Navigate to Pages → select any page → Media tab
- Upload the malicious SVG file
- Observe file contents in response/error or stored output
Recommended Fix
Option 1: Add XXE Protection Flags
php
libxml use internal errors(true);
$svg = simplexml load string($content, 'SimpleXMLElement', LIBXML NOENT | LIBXML DTDLOAD);Option 2: Use SVG Sanitizer Library (Recommended)
php
use enshrinedsvgSanitizeSanitizer;
$sanitizer = new Sanitizer();
$sanitizer->removeRemoteReferences(true);
$cleanSVG = $sanitizer->sanitize($content);The
enshrined/svg-sanitize library properly strips XXE payloads and other malicious SVG content.Request
- Please acknowledge receipt of this report within 5 business days
- Please provide an estimated timeline for a security patch
- I am happy to assist with testing the fix
- I request a CVE be assigned for this vulnerability
- If you have a security advisory process, please include me in the credits
Turki Almatrafi.
Maintainer note — fix applied (2026-04-24)
Fixed across two repos:
-
Grav core on the
2.0branch (commit5a12f9be8, ships in 2.0.0-beta.2) —VectorImageMedium:: construct(the code path that reads width/height from an uploaded SVG) now strips<!DOCTYPE>and<!ENTITY>declarations before parsing, and callssimplexml load stringwithLIBXML NONET | LIBXML NOERROR | LIBXML NOWARNING. On PHP < 8 it also callslibxml disable entity loader(true)for the duration of the parse. -
rhukster/dom-sanitizer (commit
02d08ec) — the library Grav ships as its SVG sanitizer.loadDocumentnow applies the same DOCTYPE/ENTITY strip and passesLIBXML NONETtoloadXML/loadHTML.
With both layers in place, the PoC:
xml
<!DOCTYPE svg [
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="100" height="100">
<text x="10" y="50">&xxe;</text>
</svg>no longer expands
&xxe;, and the parser cannot make outbound filesystem or network requests for external entities/DTDs. Billion-laughs-style entity expansion is also neutralized because the declarations are stripped before libxml ever sees them.Files:
system/src/Grav/Common/Page/Medium/VectorImageMedium.php.tests/unit/Grav/Common/Security/SvgXxeSecurityTest.php— XXE neutralization + billion-laughs + plain-SVG regression.- dom-sanitizer:
src/DOMSanitizer.php+ two new XXE tests in its own suite.
Fix
XXE
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Weakness Enumeration
Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Getgrav/Grav