PT-2026-41408 · Npm · Openclaw
Published
2026-05-05
·
Updated
2026-05-05
CVSS v3.1
8.8
High
| Vector | AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
Summary
The agent-facing
gateway tool protects config.apply and config.patch with a model-to-operator trust boundary. That guard used a hand-maintained denylist of protected config paths. The config schema outgrew that denylist, leaving sensitive subtrees writable through model-driven gateway config mutations.Impact
A prompt-injected or otherwise compromised model running with access to the owner-only
gateway tool could persist unsafe config changes that crossed security boundaries. Examples included config paths affecting command execution, network/proxy/TLS behavior, credential forwarding, telemetry or hook endpoints, memory/indexing surfaces, and operator policy controls. These changes could survive restart once written to config.Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclawon npm - Affected: versions before
2026.4.23 - Fixed:
2026.4.23 - Latest stable verified fixed:
openclaw@2026.4.23, tagv2026.4.23
Fix
OpenClaw replaced the denylist with a fail-closed allowlist. Agent-driven
gateway config.apply and gateway config.patch now permit only narrow agent-tunable prompt/model settings and mention-gating paths. Other config changes are rejected before the gateway mutation RPC is invoked.Fix Commit(s)
bceda6089aa7b3695cc7696b43c61ae3d01bb0ec(fix(gateway): fail closed on runtime config edits)
Severity
Severity remains
high. The vulnerable entry point is owner-only, but the model/agent is not a trusted principal under OpenClaw's security model, and the guard is the explicit model-to-operator boundary for persisted config mutation.Fix
Missing Authorization
Found an issue in the description? Have something to add? Feel free to write us 👾
Weakness Enumeration
Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Openclaw