PT-2026-42605 · Go · Github.Com/Fission/Fission

Published

2026-05-21

·

Updated

2026-05-21

CVSS v4.0

6.9

Medium

VectorAV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Summary

Before the round-1 security sweep, pkg/builder/builder.go passed Environment.spec.builder.command directly into exec.Command(...) after a strings.Fields split, with no validation of the executable path or its arguments. A user who could create or update Environment CRDs in a namespace observed by the buildermgr could thereby point the builder pod at any executable inside the builder image (e.g. /bin/sh -c '...') and execute arbitrary code in the builder pod context.

Affected component

  • pkg/builder/builder.go:254 — call site (exec.Command(buildCmd, buildArgs...)).
  • pkg/builder/builder.go:106 — input source: buildCmd, buildArgs = strings.Fields(req.BuildCommand)[0], strings.Fields(req.BuildCommand)[1:].

Impact

A subject with create / update privilege on Environment objects could:
  1. Cause the builder pod for any package using that environment to execute arbitrary code.
  2. Read whatever files the builder pod has access to inside its /packages shared volume (deployment archive payloads for that package).
  3. Write arbitrary content into the /packages shared volume, which the fetcher subsequently uploads as the package deployment archive.
The builder pod runs in the user's namespace with the fission-builder SA (not the more-privileged executor SA), so the impact is bounded to that namespace's package contents and the builder pod's own filesystem. PR:H reflects that creating / modifying Environment CRDs is typically restricted to cluster admins or platform operators.

Root cause

pkg/builder/builder.go's build-command parser did not validate the resulting executable path. Although exec.Command does not invoke a shell, it does locate the executable via $PATH, and strings.Fields splitting allowed multiple flags / sub-arguments to be passed.

Fix

Released in v1.23.0:
  • PR #3364 (commit 0f45c911) introduces Builder.resolveBuildCommand in pkg/builder/builder.go, which:
  1. Accepts an empty string (treated as the default /build).
  2. Accepts the literal /build.
  3. Accepts any absolute path that survives filepath.Clean and contains no .. segments.
  4. Rejects anything containing whitespace metacharacters or relative paths.
  • exec.Command still receives only the validated absolute path; sub-arguments continue to come from strings.Fields of the original string but are now passed positionally with no shell expansion.

Mitigation (until upgrade)

  1. Restrict who can create / update Environment CRDs to trusted operators only.
  2. Audit Environment.spec.builder.command values for any non-/build paths.
  3. Run the buildermgr with a tightened ServiceAccount that has no secret access in the builder namespace.

Fix

Improper Privilege Management

OS Command Injection

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Weakness Enumeration

CWE-250CWE-269CWE-78

Related Identifiers

GHSA-7PJR-QPVH-M339

Affected Products

Github.Com/Fission/Fission