PT-2026-42621 · Npm · Nocodb

Published

2026-05-21

·

Updated

2026-05-21

CVSS v3.1

5.4

Medium

VectorAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Summary

The refresh-token cookie was set with httpOnly: true but missing both the secure flag and the sameSite attribute. Over plain HTTP the cookie could be intercepted on the network; without sameSite, browsers attached it to cross-site POSTs, enabling CSRF against the token-refresh endpoint.

Details

In packages/nocodb/src/services/users/helpers.ts, setTokenCookie produced the cookie with only httpOnly, an expires date, and an optional domain from NC BASE HOST NAME — no secure, no sameSite. The refresh endpoint POST /api/v2/auth/token/refresh (auth.controller.ts) read the cookie unconditionally and returned a new JWT, with no CSRF token.
The fix sets httpOnly: true, sameSite: 'lax', and conditional secure: req.ncSiteUrl.startsWith('https') so the flag is active under HTTPS while still functional on plain-HTTP localhost development.
This is distinct from GHSA-x4vh-j75g-268g (refresh-token lifecycle on password reset) — different root cause, different attack vector.

Impact

  • Cookie interception on plain HTTP networks (no secure).
  • Cross-site refresh: malicious cross-origin pages could trigger token refresh and, combined with any same-origin XSS or open-redirect on the NocoDB domain, capture the new JWT.
  • Refresh tokens have multi-day expiry (NC REFRESH TOKEN EXP IN DAYS), so the exposure window is long.

Credit

This issue was reported by @ik0z.

Fix

Weakness Enumeration

CWE-614

Related Identifiers

GHSA-F74W-272X-MQCV

Affected Products

Nocodb