PT-2026-42831 · Docker · Docker Desktop
David Rochester
+1
·
Published
2026-05-22
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Updated
2026-05-22
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CVE-2026-5843
CVSS v3.1
8.2
High
| Vector | AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H |
The MLX inference backend in Docker Model Runner on macOS uses the MLX-LM library, which unconditionally imports and executes arbitrary Python files from model directories via the model file configuration field in config.json. When a model's config.json specifies a model file pointing to a Python file, MLX-LM uses importlib to load and execute it with no trust remote code gate or equivalent safety check. The MLX backend runs without sandboxing, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the Docker host as the Docker Desktop user.
Any container on the Docker network can trigger this by calling the model-runner.docker.internal API to pull a malicious model from an attacker-controlled OCI registry and request inference.
Fix
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Weakness Enumeration
Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Docker Desktop