PT-2026-43631 · Npm · @Hapi/Wreck
Published
2026-05-27
·
Updated
2026-05-27
·
CVE-2026-44979
CVSS v4.0
6.3
Medium
| Vector | AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N |
Impact
When
@hapi/wreck follows a 3xx redirect to a different hostname, only the Authorization and Cookie headers are stripped. The standard credential header Proxy-Authorization is forwarded intact to the redirect target, potentially exposing forward-proxy credentials to a host outside the original trust boundary.Redirect following is opt-in. The redirects option defaults to false (no redirections followed), so applications are only affected if they have explicitly set redirects to a positive integer on the request or via
Wreck.defaults({ redirects: ... }).Patches
@hapi/wreck 18.1.1 extends the cross-hostname strip set to include proxy-authorization. Upgrade to 18.1.1 or later.Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible:
- Leave redirects at its default (
false) — applications that never enable redirect following are not affected. - If redirects are required, set redirects: 0 when calling endpoints with sensitive headers, or strip Proxy-Authorization from the headers before issuing the request.
- Use the
beforeRedirecthook to manually strip proxy-authorization (and any other sensitive application headers) whenredirectOptionstargets a different hostname than the original request.
Resources
- Related: CVE-2024-30260 / GHSA-3787-6prv-h9w3 (undici)
- RFC 7235 §4.4 — Proxy-Authorization
Fix
Information Disclosure
Insufficiently Protected Credentials
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Related Identifiers
Affected Products
@Hapi/Wreck