PT-2026-44417 · Tigera · Calico+2
Anthony Tam
+1
·
Published
2026-05-28
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Updated
2026-05-28
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CVE-2026-6720
CVSS v4.0
7.2
High
| Vector | AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H |
When calicoctl is invoked with --log-level=info or --log-level=debug, the client prints the full contents of its loaded connection-configuration struct to stderr in a single log line. The struct embeds every credential calicoctl uses to talk to the cluster — inline kubeconfig (with bearer token), Kubernetes API bearer token, etcd password, and inline PEM-encoded etcd client certificate and key. Any reader of that stderr stream — CI job logs, session-recording archives, shared support-ticket transcripts, or local filesystem viewers on the host that ran calicoctl — can extract these credentials with zero Kubernetes privilege. calicoctl's default log level is panic, so this issue only triggers when verbose logging is explicitly enabled.
Fix
Insertion into Log File
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Weakness Enumeration
Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Calico
Calico Cloud
Calico Enterprise