PT-2026-45022 · Npm · Vm2
Published
2026-05-29
·
Updated
2026-05-29
·
CVE-2026-47139
CVSS v3.1
8.6
High
| Vector | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N |
Summary
NodeVM supports excluding public network builtins from the wildcard builtin option. With this configuration direct access to http, https, http2, net, dgram, tls, dns, and dns/promises is blocked.However, Node.js also exposes underscored internal HTTP builtins such as
http client and http server. These are not blocked when the public modules are excluded.Sandboxed code can use these internal builtins to make outbound HTTP requests and open listening HTTP sockets even though the public network modules are denied.
Note: This is not host RCE. It is a network capability bypass that can lead to SSRF-style access to internal services.
Details
The wildcard builtin expansion is based on Node.js builtin module names:
const BUILTIN MODULES = (nmod.builtinModules || Object.getOwnPropertyNames(process.binding('natives')))
.filter(s=>!s.startsWith('internal/') && !DANGEROUS BUILTINS.has(s));
Public modules can be excluded with
-name:if (builtins.indexOf(`-${name}`) === -1) {
addDefaultBuiltin(res, name, hostRequire);
}
But excluding
http and net does not exclude internal siblings such as: http client
http server
tls wrap
These internal modules expose network primitives.
Confirmed examples:
require(' http client').ClientRequest(...)performs an outbound HTTP request to a host-local service whilehttpandnetare blocked.require(' http server').Server(...).listen(...)opens a listening HTTP socket whilehttpandnetare blocked.
PoC
Tested on:
vm2: 3.11.2
Node.js: v25.9.0
Run from the vm2 repository root:
node poc/internal-http-builtin-network-bypass.js
The PoC first confirms the intended restrictions work then bypasses them:
require(" http client").ClientRequest(...)
This performs an HTTP request to a host-local service and reads the response.
It also confirms:
require(" http server").Server(...).listen(0)
This opens a listening HTTP socket from inside the sandbox.
Impact
An attacker who can run untrusted JavaScript inside
NodeVM with this affected builtin configuration can regain network access even when the application attempted to block network modules.This can allow SSRF-style access to localhost services, metadata endpoints, internal admin panels, or other network resources reachable from the host process.
Suggested fix
Treat underscored internal network modules as dangerous or link their availability to the public module they wrap.
At minimum, exclude related internal modules such as:
http agent
http client
http common
http incoming
http outgoing
http server
tls common
tls wrap
Alternatively, deny underscored Node.js internals from wildcard builtin expansion by default.
Fix
Protection Mechanism Failure
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Weakness Enumeration
Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Vm2